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Abstract 
Author:  Ann-Marie de Lange Glasø, 2012 
Title:     Prerequisites for safe driving after brain injury: Exploring the additional value 
of BRIEF-A and Awareness Questionnaire in cognitive assessments for 
holding a drivers’ license. 
Supervisors: Pål Ulleberg, Associate Professor, PhD, Department of Psychology, UIO 
                       Anne-Kristine Schanke, Professor, PhD, Department of Psychology, UIO 
 
Objective: The present study explores the additional value of BRIEF-A and Awareness 
Questionnaire in cognitive assessments for holding a drivers’ license. The potential additional 
value of the questionnaires was studied by investigating the statistical correlations between 
the questionnaires and neuropsychological tests. The relationships between the measures of 
self-awareness and outcome in the conclusions for or against holding a drivers’ license were 
examined. Furthermore, the relationship between location of injury (left, right or multifocal) 
and both outcome (fulfilling criteria for driving or not) and self-awareness was investigated. 
Research design: Totally, 89 inpatients at Sunnaas Rehabilitation hospital with 
cerebrovascular accidents (stroke) and traumatic brain injury (TBI) were assessed 
consecutively using a standardized neuropsychological driving battery. In addition, the 
patients completed two self-reporting scales, i.e. Awareness Questionnaire (AQ), measuring 
self-awareness, and Behaviour Rating Inventory of Executive Function (BRIEF-A), 
measuring executive function in daily life. The questionnaires were not part of the basis for 
the decisions for or against holding a drivers’ license. Both questionnaires included 
corresponding ratings from relatives, and the discrepancy between the patients’ and the 
relatives’ scores were calculated and used as an indication of the patients’ degree of self-
awareness.  
Results: Some significant relationships were found between Awareness Questionnaire and 
neuropsychological tests, predominantly on the Motor/Sensory subscale. Only two weak 
correlations were found between BRIEF-A and neuropsychological tests. No significant 
differences were found between the patients fulfilling criteria for driving and the patients not 
fulfilling criteria for driving in terms of self-awareness. Nine patients categorized with 
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impaired self-awareness on Awareness Questionnaire fulfilled the criteria for driving, as did 
six patients categorized with impaired self-awareness on BRIEF-A. Localization of injury was 
not significantly related to outcome or measures of self-awareness although there was a 
tendency for patients with right hemisphere injury to not fulfill the criteria for driving. 
Conclusion: The results indicate that both BRIEF-A and the Awareness Questionnaire may 
serve as valuable supplements in fitness-to-drive assessments, as they seem to measure 
aspects of higher order cognitive functioning relevant for the ability to adjust driving behavior 
post injury, which are not covered by neuropsychological tests. Long-term follow-up accident 
studies should be conducted with large groups of subjects who are assessed comprehensively 
in order to establish more evidence-based guidelines. The contribution of self-awareness as 
part of the prerequisites in decision-making for holding a drivers` license should be given 
attention. 
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1 Introduction 
Fitness-to-drive assessments imply complex issues, as injuries or illnesses that affect the brain 
involve impairment in different cognitive functions varying across individuals, diagnoses, and 
the nature and extent of injuries. One important aspect of cognition related to safe driving is 
the ability to recognize one’s own level of cognitive functioning. After having met patients 
who exhibited impaired self-awareness after brain injury, the author’s interest in this 
phenomenon increased greatly. While neuropsychological tests can provide a solid measure of 
patients’ impairment level, they do not measure the patients’ self-awareness of level of 
functioning. Thus, impaired self-awareness can be difficult to detect in standard assessments. 
The author’s clinical experience and interest in the phenomena of impaired self-awareness 
resulted in the present paper, where impaired self-awareness is explored in relation to fitness-
to-drive assessments. 
Decisions concerning patients’ fitness for driving after acquired brain injury are of 
importance for public health, considering the high number of people injured in traffic each 
year: In 2011, 168 people were killed, 679 were severely injured, and 8363 were injured in 
traffic accidents in Norway (Statistics Norway, SSB). Compared to 2010, the numbers have 
decreased about 8 per cent, and the long-term trend shows a significant decline in the number 
of serious injuries and fatalities due to traffic accidents on Norwegian roads. The legislation 
of seatbelts and enhanced safety design in cars has contributed to reduction of severe injuries 
(Butcher et al., 2007). However, the incidence of traffic accidents is increasing in developing 
countries (Finfer & Cohen, 2001), and the World Health Organisation estimates that traffic 
accidents will be the third leading cause of disability and death worldwide by 2020 (Ad Hoc 
Committee on Health Research Relating to Future Intervention Options. Investing in Health 
Research and Development (Document TDR: Gen: 96.1). Geneva: World Health 
Organisation, 1996, as cited in Finfer & Cohen, 2001). Hence, safe driving and reducing 
accidents is of profound importance in our society today. 
Traumatic brain injury (TBI) remains the leading cause of disability and death in 
young adults in western countries, where traffic accidents contribute (Maas, Stocchetti & 
Bullock, 2008). In addition to causing mortality, TBI often result in long-lasting functional 
impairments in survivors (Finfer & Cohen, 2001). However, improvements of technical 
adaptations in cars enable people with severe physical injuries to drive, and the prevalence of 
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TBI survivors who resume driving is around 50 % (Tamietto et al., 2006; Van Zomeren, 
Brouwer & Minderhoud, 1987). As with TBI, cerebrovascular accidents (stroke) can cause 
cognitive impairments that might influence the ability to drive safely (Marshall et al., 2007). 
Many stroke patients experience persisting impairments, yet around 30 -50% resume driving 
(Coleman Bryer, Rapport & Hanks, 2005 as cited in Scott et al., 2009; Fisk, Owsley & Pulley, 
1997). For many adults who have suffered from brain injury, resuming driving is an important 
aspect of restoring back to a normal life. However, this constitutes an issue of public health 
and safety considering the number of people involved in traffic at all times (Tamietto et. al, 
2006). 
While some studies have observed no significant differences in the likelihood of 
accidents between post-brain injury drivers and healthy controls (Haselkorn, Mueller & 
Rivara, 1998; Schulteis, Matheis, Nead & DeLuca, 2002), other studies have demonstrated 
significantly higher risk of being involved in traffic accidents after having suffered from brain 
injury (Bivona et al., 2012; Formisano et al., 2005; Neyens & Boyle, 2012; Schanke, Rike, 
Mølmen & Østen, 2008). So far, there are no official statistics documenting the number of 
people in Norway who, after brain injury, are involved in traffic accidents after resuming his 
or her driving licence. However, a study conducted by Schanke et al. (2008) which included 
former stroke and TBI patients assessed for fitness to drive at Sunnaas Rehabilitation Hospital 
in Norway, showed that the TBI group had an accident rate 3 times higher than the matched 
normal population 6-9 years post-injury, while the stroke group showed accident rates within 
a normal range. However, both stroke and TBI often involve cognitive impairments that 
presumably may affect the ability to drive safely (Finfer & Cohen, 2001; Marshall et al., 
2007), as safe driving performance is a complex process that depends on an interaction of 
motor, perceptual, sensory and visual skills in addition to a variety of cognitive abilities 
(Smith-Arena, Edelstein & Rabadi, 2006). High information processing speed, selective 
attention, working memory, inhibition, initiation and decision making are all important 
aspects of driving. To some extent, driving is an over-learned thus automated process where 
driving behaviour corresponds to routine activities. However, when unexpected situations 
occur, as often in traffic, a shift from automated processes to controlled, executive functions 
is necessary (Lundquist, 2001). Being able to judge the situation, act appropriate and continue 
to drive safely requires such higher order cognitive abilities as mentioned above. 
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Michon (1985) describes driving performance as problem solving in a hierarchical, 
interconnected structure. The operative level requires the driver to react instantly in terms of 
handling the car, for instance by calculating braking speed and distance. The tactical level 
requires information processing about other drivers, evaluation of complex traffic situations 
as well as flexibility, planning and adaptation within a limited timeframe, which requires 
adequate judgement, focused attention, inhibition of distracters and realistic awareness of self 
(Tamietto et al., 2006). The strategic level implies that the driver makes decisions related to 
driving without time constraint, e. g., evaluating which road is safest when slippery or 
whether he or she will drive when tired. By making adequate strategic decisions, for example 
avoiding rush-hour traffic, a driver can compensate for lower level cognitive impairments. 
Management of possible danger depends on risk acceptance (Tamietto et al., 2006). Thus, the 
tactical and strategic level relies on metacognitive self-reflection, and requires awareness of 
own driving performance and cognitive function (Lundquist & Alinder, 2007). Brain injury 
may impair these functions in different ways, and accordingly affect the ability to drive 
safely. 
The first section in this paper gives a brief overview of fitness-to-drive assessments. 
The paper further provides a clarification of the construct of self-awareness as an aspect of 
‘higher cognitive abilities’, related to the importance of this concept in safe driving. The 
relationship between measures of self-awareness and neuropsychological data is statistically 
investigated in the context of fitness-to-drive assessments, followed by an examination of 
localisation of injury in relation to self-awareness and outcome (fulfilling criteria for driving 
or not). Finally, the paper provides a discussion of the findings including methodological 
issues and implications, and gives recommendations for future research. 
1.1 Assessment of fitness to drive 
Within the legal requirements of the Norwegian Directorate of Health, resuming driving after 
having suffered a disease, such as brain injury, demands that the patient meets the health 
requirements for driving (Forskrift om førerkort m.m. nr. 298, 2004). Physicians, 
psychologists and optometrists are legally obliged to notify authorities in cases where a 
patient does not fulfil the health requirements for driving (Helsepersonelloven § 34, 1999), 
and the condition is expected to have a duration of six months or more (Forskrift om 
helsekrav til bilførere mv, nr. 1467, 1984). In cases of doubt after medical assessments, the 
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General Practitioner (doctor) may refer to comprehensive multimodal fitness-to-drive 
assessments, which often includes on-the-road driving assessments in addition to cognitive 
assessments. The Norwegian authorities specify the criteria for holding a driver’s license, but 
assessments conducted in Norway most likely show great variability (Schanke & Sundet, 
2000). To avoid unequal patient treatment, best practice guidelines for fitness-to-drive 
assessments have recently been developed (Norsk Psykologforening, 2012). Although the 
health requirements for driving (Forskrift om førerkort m.m. nr. 298, 2004) includes clinical 
populations that constitute risk groups, there is no systematic enumeration of symptoms that 
may interfere with the health requirements. Hence, the best-practice guidelines include 
cognitive impairments such as neglect, apraxia, agnosia, visuospatial impairment, prolonged 
reaction time, reduced judgment and reduced self-awareness as symptoms considered contrary 
to safe driving (Norsk Psykologforening, 2012). However, various diagnoses make fitness-to-
drive assessments problematic and challenging. While lateralized brain injuries from stroke 
can result in focal deficits such as neglect, aphasia or apraxia, multi-focal injuries from TBI 
often create diffuse cognitive outcomes including impaired executive function and 
metacognition. Impairments in such higher order cognitive abilities are often associated with 
frontal lobe injuries. However, injury in other regions of the brain due to stroke or TBI may 
also result in such deficits (Stuss & Levine, 2002) because of diffuse axonal injury (Xu, 
Rasmussen, Lagopoulos & Håberg, 2007) which might disrupt structural and functional 
connections within neural networks (Sharp et al., 2011). Deficits in higher order cognitive 
abilities, such as reduced self-awareness, are difficult to assess and measure with 
neuropsychological tests as such assessments are standardized and time limited.  
In fitness-to-drive assessments, one procedure has been employing neuropsychological 
tests as a basis for assessing cognitive ability to drive, within the framework of the health 
requirements for driving. However, standardized neuropsychological assessments measure 
cognitive functions equivalent to the operational and to some extent the tactical level of 
driving, and the assessment does not entirely include all aspects of driving performance, such 
as self-awareness and the patients’ ability to cope with cognitive impairment on a strategic 
level (Lundquist & Alinder, 2007). Research emphasizes, in addition to medical data and 
cognitive function, that personality factors, previous driving behaviour and self-awareness 
should be taken into account as essential factors when considering someone’s ability to drive 
safely after brain injury (Tamietto et al., 2006). Accordingly, a study by Pietrapiana et al. 
(2005) on patients with TBI (N =66), showed that premorbid factors such as pre-injury 
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personality traits and pre-injury driving style explained up to 72% of the driving performance 
post-injury evaluated by traffic rules violations and accidents. In addition, these premorbid 
factors turned out to be better predictors than neuropsychological, medical, biographic and 
demographic measures in the same sample. Patomella, Kottorp and Tham (2008) conducted a 
study to investigate awareness of driving disability in stroke patients (N=38). The awareness 
of driving disability was measured by the calculated discrepancy between self-reported 
driving ability and observed driving actions in a driving simulator. The result showed that the 
patients who scored below cut off criterion for the driving evaluation also had limited 
awareness of their driving disability. Scott (2010) found similar results showing that stroke 
patients who overestimated their cognitive function predicted their driving ability less 
accurate and performed worse in a driving simulator than the patients who exhibited intact 
self-awareness. A study by Griffen, Rapport, Coleman Bryer, Bieliauskas & Burt (2011) 
found that patients with impaired awareness after acquired brain injury had less success on an 
on-road driving evaluation than their counterparts with intact self-awareness. Furthermore, the 
results showed that when self-awareness of impairments increased, driving improved. Thus, 
self-awareness should be considered an important aspect in fitness-to-drive assessments. 
However, the number of studies that have included measures of self-awareness when 
investigating critical factors for safe driving are limited, and more research is highly needed 
to enable an understanding of the relevance of self-awareness in driving. Furthermore, the 
lack of consensus in the international field of study makes comparisons difficult, as 
assessment methods and outcome measures are highly varied. However, standardized 
neuropsychological and medical measures mostly account for domain-specific areas of 
cognitive function and perceptual motor skills corresponding to the operational and some 
extent tactical level, and as such, do not include all aspects of safe driving such as premorbid 
personality or self-awareness. Recent empirical research, however, clearly indicate a need to 
address such factors as well in driving evaluations.     
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1.2 Executive function, Metacognition and Self-
Awareness 
The executive functions comprise the capabilities that enable a person to engage in goal 
directed, independent behavior (Lezak, 2004). Executive functions include a range of 
cognitive processes such as planning, problem solving, multitasking, the ability to manage 
novelty and cognitive flexibility (Burgess, Veitch, de lacy Costello & Shallice, 2000; 
Grafman & Litvan, 1999; Lezak, 2004; Stuss, Shallice, Alexander & Picton, 1995), and are, 
by such, considered essential in safe driving performance (Schanke & Sundet, 2000). 
Executive functions also include components of behavioral and ‘emotional’ processes such as 
decision-making involving emotional interpretation, the experience of reward and 
punishment, and regulation of social behavior (Anderson, Anderson, Northam, Jacobs & 
Mikiewicz, 2002; Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Lee, 1999; Bechara, Tranel, Damasio & 
Damasio, 1996). Various definitions abound for the concept of executive functions, and 
despite the consensus regarding executive functions’ significance for human adaption there is 
a lack of clarity about the terms, components and the variables that measures them (Jurado & 
Rosselli, 2007).  
Executive functions are often referred to as ‘higher order cognitive abilities’ along 
with Metacognition (Chiu, Carlson, Arnett, Consentine & Hillary, 2011), which involves the 
ability to hold the track of one’s own cognitive processes. Fostering evaluative judgements of 
mind-content such as attitudes, beliefs, experiences and desires is necessary for guiding one’s 
decisions and behaviour, as well as understanding other’s mental states (Schmitz, Kawahara-
Baccus & Johnson, 2004). Metacognition includes both metacognitive knowledge, which 
refers to stored beliefs and knowledge about one’s cognitive abilities, strategies and tasks that 
guides cognitive operations, and metacognitive experience pertaining the monitoring that 
occurs in the moment of cognitive engagement (Flavell, 1979). Metacognitive monitoring 
refers to awareness of one’s performance during a task, whereas behavioral regulation, a 
concept often associated with the executive functions (Anderson, et al., 2002; Gioia & 
Isquith, 2004; Gioia, Isquith, Guy, & Kenworthy, 2000), reflects the ability to adjust and 
change strategies to improve performance as a response to task demands (Toglia & Kirk, 
2000). It has been suggested that behavioral regulation depends on accurate metacognitive 
monitoring or awareness (Borkowski, 1996), and that metacognitive judgments influence the 
exertion of executive control over behavior. In accordance, some research has demonstrated a 
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relationship between behavioral adjustments and judgments of performance (Karpicke, 2009), 
and correlations between poor performances on executive tasks and reduced metacognitive 
awareness have been found (Bivona et al., 2008; Ciurli et al., 2010). In this respect, 
metacognition are closely related to executive function. However, research findings are highly 
varied, and while some studies have revealed significant correlations between metacognition 
and executive function (Karpicke, 2009; Lysaker et al., 2008), others have failed to 
demonstrate consistent relationships (Chiu et al., 2011; Erez, Rothschild, Katz, Tuchner & 
Hartman-Maeir, 2009). Some argue that these constructs may be related but still have 
divergent demands and unique characteristics (Chiu et al., 2011).  
Although many researchers emphasize the similarity between components of 
executive function and metacognition (Fernandez-Duque, Baird & Posner, 2000; Shimamura, 
2000), these are often presented as two separated constructs in the literature, which might 
reflect the variation of research methods and the challenges related to measuring these 
abilities. However, models of executive function and metacognition both include higher order 
cognitive processes that control and monitor more basic information processing (Chiu et al., 
2011), and there are evidence of overlapping neural networks engaging in metacognitive- and 
executive tasks (Stuss, 2011). The ambiguity comprising these higher order cognitive 
functions also applies for the concept of self-awareness, which is often related to executive 
functions within neuropsychology, and associated with metacognition in cognitive 
psychology (Toglia & Kirk, 2000). Various terminology derived from different perspectives 
has led to substantial challenges regarding the understanding of self-awareness, and the 
literature is characterized by a range of research approaches and inconsistent findings. 
However, while executive functions remain imprecisely defined, most researchers include 
metacognitive skills such as self-monitoring among the components (Hart, Whyte, Kim & 
Vaccaro, 2005). In the present paper, self-awareness is regarded as an aspect of 
metacognition, and related to executive function mainly due to the relevance of both 
executive function and self-awareness in driving. 
Regardless of the discussion concerning the relationship between executive function, 
metacognition and self-awareness, there is consensus about self-awareness, or an adequate 
understanding of one’s own level of functioning, as an important aspect of higher order 
cognitive functions (Ciruli et al., 2010; Prigatano, Altman & O’Brien, 1990; Toglia & Kirk, 
2000). In clinical neuropsychology, the term self-awareness broadly refers to the ability to 
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recognize impairments in functioning caused by brain damage (Ciruli et al., 2010). Prigatano 
& Schacter (1991, as cited in Prigatano & Klonoff, 1998) defines impaired self-awareness as 
impairment in the ability to consciously perceive and experience disruption in higher cerebral 
functioning. Impaired self-awareness of own deficits is a common sequaele of acquired brain 
injury (Hartman-Maeir, Soroker, Ring, & Katz, 2000; Sherer, Hart, Whyte, Nick & Yablon, 
2005; Starkstein, Jorge, & Robinson, 2010), and the importance of understanding this 
phenomenon is highly emphasized, as research indicates that impaired self-awareness often 
influence rehabilitation outcome (Ekstam, Uppgard, Kottorp, & Tham, 2007; Sherer, 
Bergloff, Levin et al., 1998).  
Early models emphasized that the construct of self-awareness includes different 
components. Crosson et al. (1989) divided self-awareness into the following areas: 
Intellectual awareness, representing the patients’ ability to describe their impaired 
functioning; emergent awareness, referring to the ability to recognize the problems as they 
occur; and anticipatory awareness, which refers to the patients’ ability to predict when 
problems caused by their deficits will arise. As an extension of Crosson et al.’s model, Toglia 
& Kirk (2000) proposed a comprehensive framework, which deals with the concept of self-
awareness as a dynamic process rather than distinct, hierarchical levels. The model 
differentiates between metacognitive knowledge about ones abilities, which includes 
intellectual awareness, and online awareness of performance during tasks, including elements 
of both emergent awareness and anticipatory awareness. In relation to Michons’ model of safe 
driving performance (1985), intellectual awareness is relevant to driving at the operational 
and to some extent the tactical level, while emergent awareness is relevant to driving at the 
tactical level. Anticipatory awareness is crucial when operating on the strategic level.  
Toglia & Kirk’s model (2000) further differentiates between pre-existing beliefs and 
knowledge about oneself, and knowledge that are activated during a task. The concept pre-
existing knowledge is a result of repeated experiences over time and are, as such, relatively 
stable (Brown, 1987, as cited in Toglia & Kirk, 2000). The term online awareness includes 
the ability to monitor behaviour and performance within action (Hart, Giovannetti, 
Montgomery & Schwartz, 1998), and varies depending on task and situation. Thus, online 
awareness is relatively unstable in contrast to pre-existing knowledge (Brown, 1987, as cited 
in Toglia & Kirk, 2000). Pre-existing knowledge influences self-awareness within the context 
of a situation or a task, and the results of self-monitoring activities interacts with pre-existing 
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knowledge by being compared to expectations based on earlier experiences. The discrepancy 
between what one expects to do and what one actually does may result in adjustment of 
behaviour and change in strategy. Eventually, the perception of the outcome, within the 
context of a particular situation, may restructure the beliefs and knowledge about one’s 
abilities (Flavell, Miller & Miller, 1993, as cited in Toglia & Kirk, 2000). As such, this model 
includes the importance of self-awareness for the ability to develop compensatory strategies, 
or coping, which is a decisive aspect of driving after having suffered from brain injury 
resulting in impaired cognitive functions. Coping is related to the strategic level of driving 
performance, hence, a driver can compensate for lower level cognitive impairments making 
adequate strategic decisions like avoiding rush-hour traffic. Furthermore, the constant 
dynamic interaction between pre-existing knowledge and on-line awareness proposed in this 
model includes an explanation of how the perception of one’s abilities interacts with 
performance on different tasks and varies depending on contexts and situation. Factors such 
as personality, culture and task meaningfulness are emphasized as influential (Toglia & Kirk, 
2000). As such, online awareness, both emergent and anticipatory, may be evident in some 
situations but not in others. This highlights the importance of context for self-awareness, 
which is highly relevant in fitness-to-drive assessments, and thus, addressed in section 4. 
Another important point in the model is the possible dissociation between intellectual 
awareness, i.e. recognizing the level of functioning, and emergent and anticipatory awareness, 
i.e. the use of this knowledge to monitor online performance and to predict difficulties that are 
likely to occur because of the deficit. The dissociation between the components of self-
awareness is highly relevant to the ability to drive safely, as the use of intellectual awareness 
to monitor online performance and to make strategic decisions is essential to driving 
performance at the tactical and strategic level (Lundquist & Alinder, 2007). 
Furthermore, research indicates that patients with brain injury are more accurate in 
assessing their own limitations regarding easily observable deficits such as physical 
constraints or daily life activities than deficits in higher order cognitive functions, where 
impaired self-awareness seems to play a more prominent role (Prigatano, 1996). This implies 
that patients might have intact awareness regarding their driving performance at the 
operational level, while they lack accurate awareness of their driving performance at the 
tactical and strategic level of driving. Although Toglia & Kirk’s model (2000) emphasize how 
the perception of one’s abilities interacts with performance on different tasks, and varies 
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depending on contexts and situation, it does not explain the dissociation between awareness of 
physical impairments and awareness of impairment in higher order cognitive abilities. 
To summarize, relating Toglia & Kirk’s model of self-awareness (2000) to Michon’s 
three levels of driving (1985), respectively, may contribute to a more specific understanding 
of the relevance of self-awareness in driving performance. In the present paper, the concepts 
first described by Crosson et al. (1989), i.e. intellectual, emergent and anticipatory awareness, 
are used in relation to the levels of driving performance, and regarded as components of self-
awareness underlying metacognitive knowledge and online awareness (Toglia & Kirk, 2000). 
Toglia & Kirk’s model (2000) provides clarification around the complexity of the concept 
self-awareness, and includes the key issue of dissociation between the levels of awareness, an 
aspect highly relevant to safe driving performance. However, there are limited research 
methods developed to assess the relevance of such theoretic models, and the potential 
effectiveness of Toglia & Kirk’s theoretical driven approach on assessment and interventions 
have not yet been systematically evaluated (Fleming & Ownsworth, 2006). Bach and David 
(2006) underline the major difficulty in understanding the complex construct of self-
awareness, and define self-awareness in operational terms “as a process by which an 
individual is able to rate their behavioural responses (physical, somatic, cognitive and 
affective) in accordance with ratings with some objective standard, usually from an informant, 
who knows the individual well” (p. 398). The operationalization of the concept of self-
awareness is based on the most commonly used method for examining self-awareness in 
patients with brain injury (Fleming, Strong & Ashton, 1996) which will be described in 
section 1.3.   
1.2.1 Neural correlates of Executive function and Self-
Awareness  
In the quest for the understanding of higher order cognitive abilities, researchers from various 
disciplines have embarked upon the study of the neural mechanisms underlying executive 
function and the capability to generate metacognitive evaluations of oneself. Both 
neuroimaging studies and lesion studies have contributed to the current knowledge of the 
neural activity behind these higher order cognitive functions. The lack of clarity about these 
concepts and the various methods applied for examining them makes the research literature 
challenging to summarize. This section presents some essential key findings. 
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Neuroimaging studies have demonstrated an association between frontal networks and 
both executive function (Collette, Hogge, Salmon & Van der Linden, 2006; Jurado & 
Rosselli, 2007) and metacognition (Chua, Schacter, Rand-Giovannetti & Sperling, 2006; 
Fernandez-Duque et al., 2000). There is a common acceptance that components of executive 
functions are associated with different areas of the frontal lobes (Stuss & Alexander, 2000), as 
studies have revealed frontal lobe involvement during a number of executive tasks (see Jurado 
& Rosselli, 2007 for an overview). However, there is an emerging consensus that the central 
involvement of the frontal lobes is a part of functionally independent, but closely interacting 
networks including thalamic pathways and subcortical structures (Fernandes-Duquet et al., 
2000; Lewis, Dove, Robbins, Barker, & Owen, 2004; Løvstad et al., in press). Thus, many 
current researchers focus on the connectivity, or neural circuits between these areas rather 
than the specific structures in relation to different aspects of executive function (Royall et al., 
2002). However, the specificity of neural networks and structures involved in executive 
function are still subject to uncertainty. 
The evidence on the neural correlates of self-awareness from functional imaging 
studies conducted on healthy subjects is limited (Johnson et al., 2002). So far, recent studies 
examining metacognitive evaluations have converged on the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) 
as an important part in a neural system involved in self-awareness (Johnson et al., 2002; 
Kelley et al., 2002; Schmitz et al., 2004). In an event-related fMRI study, Kelley et al. (2002) 
found greater activation in areas including the anterior cingulate and the left inferior frontal 
cortex when comparing ‘self’- and ‘other judgements’ with a third condition; ‘case 
judgements’. The results further revealed evidence of significant higher activation in the 
MPFC and the posterior cingulate during the condition ‘self-judgements’ when directly 
compared to the two other conditions, suggesting that these areas may play an important role 
in metacognitive evaluations of self. Importantly, the activation in these regions decreased 
when all encoding trials were contrasted with baseline activity across all participants, 
indicating that the observed positive activity actually resulted from the difference between 
two decreases relative to baseline. Interestingly, the activity in MPFC was markedly reduced 
relative to baseline during both ‘other’- and ‘case judgements’, whiles the ‘self-judgement’ 
condition gave a much weaker decrease in the MPFC. Typically, in research, responses in 
MPFC are referred to as an increase in brain activation relative to baseline (Kelley et al., 
2002). However, responses in MPFC are usually observed as decreases in activity relative to 
baseline (Gusnard & Raichle, 2001). Consistent with the evidence of high baseline metabolic 
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activity in the MPFC at rest (Raichle et al., 2001), it has been suggested that the MPFC is 
involved in a baseline default mode of brain function exhibiting task-related decreases in 
brain activity (Shulman et al., 1997). I.e., self-relevant mental activity is part of the brain’s 
default, or spontaneous mental activity, which is present in the absence of external 
information processing. Thus, when participants are engaged in externally directed decisions, 
the MPFC are suspended, resulting in decreased activation, and when participants engage in 
self-relevant decisions the activity in MPFC reflects the default MPFC activity at rest (Kelley 
et al., 2002). 
Lesion studies have been conducted on samples with specific deficits such as 
anosognosia for hemiplegia (Marcel, Tegner & Nimmo-Smith, 2004; Moro, Pernigo, 
Zapparoli, Cordioli & Aglioti, 2011) and degenerative diseases such as Alzheimer’s 
(Harwood et al., 2005; Rosen et al., 2010; Salmon et al., 2006), showing mixed findings 
varying largely across diagnoses. Confined to the relevance of the sample in the current study, 
impaired self-awareness has been associated with right-hemisphere lesions involving both 
cortical structures (temporal, insular and parietal lobes) and sub-cortical structures (basal 
ganglia and thalamus) in stroke patients (Starkstein et al., 2010), while research on TBI 
patients emphasizes the relevance of prefrontal cortex in self-awareness (Consentino & Stern, 
2005). Consistent with the functional imaging data on healthy subjects, an fMRI study 
conducted by Schmitz, Rowley, Kawahara & Johnson (2006) indicated that frontal networks, 
specifically MPFC and retrosplenial cortical regions, were involved in self-awareness in TBI 
patients. Sherer et al. (2005) emphasize that rather than focal lesions, broadly distributed 
networks may be damaged in cases of impaired self-awareness. However, the neural networks 
related to executive function, metacognition and self-awareness are not yet completely 
understood in regards to specificity and extent. Accordingly, research including the factor of 
severity of brain injury show inconsistent results (Leathem, Murphy & Flett, 1998; O’Keeffe, 
Dockree, Moloney, Carton & Robertson, 2007).   
Importantly, neural deficits are not the only emphasized factor related to impaired self-
awareness. The psychological factor denial, a defence mechanism conceptualized by Freud 
(1938, as cited in Prigatano & Klonoff, 1998), and defined as ‘an automatic psychological 
process that protects the individual against anxiety and from awareness of internal or external 
stressor or dangers’ (American Psychiatric Association, 1994, p. 765) stands out as 
particularly relevant to impaired self-awareness (Ownsworth, McFarland & Young, 2002). In 
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the early psychiatric literature, it was emphasized that the symptoms of impaired self-
awareness might reflect emotional disturbances (Prigatano & Klonoff, 1998), and not only 
direct sequelae of brain injury as assumed in the early neurological tradition. Consequently, 
Frederik (1969, as cited in Cutting, 1978) divided the phenomena of self-awareness into 
‘anosognostic behavioral disturbances’ and ‘explicit denial’, emphasizing that one should not 
confuse denial of illness with impaired self-awareness of illness, or anosognosia. He further 
suggested the former to be understood in psychological terms and the latter in neurological 
terms (House & Hodges, 1988). However, current evidence show that anosognosia and 
emotional denial tend to re-occur (Kortte, Chwalisz & Wegener, 2003), which makes a clear 
distinction difficult to determine.  
In summary, the neural correlates and mechanisms underlying self-awareness are not 
yet clearly understood (Rosen, 2011). As recent evidence suggests that neural contingent 
deficits in self-awareness and denial do seem to re-occur (Kortte, Chwalisz & Wegener, 
2003), the relative contribution of psychological and neuropsychological factors on impaired 
self-awareness should be emphasized (Ownsworth et al., 2002). However, this is beyond the 
scope of the current study. Although there is an increasing focus on widespread neural 
networks in relation to higher order cognitive abilities (Fernandes-Duquet et al., 2000; Lewis 
et al., 2004; Løvstad et al., in press), impaired awareness has been associated with right-
hemisphere lesions in stroke patients (Starkstein et al., 2010) and with prefrontal deficits in 
TBI patients (Consentino & Stern, 2005; Schmitz et al., 2006). In the present study, 
localization of injury is categorized as left hemisphere injury, right hemisphere injury, 
multifocal injury and cerebellum/pons injury, with the intent to explore the relationship 
between localization of injury and self-awareness.  
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1.2.2 Impaired Executive function, Self-Awareness and driving  
Technical adaptations in cars enable driving with severe physical injuries, and as such, ease 
the driving performance on the operational level for patients resuming driving after brain 
injury. Furthermore, patients’ seem to assess their physical limitations more accurately 
compared to impairments in higher order cognitive functioning (Bach & David, 2006; 
Prigatano, 1996), which implies that the tactical and strategic level of driving are of profound 
importance. Driving at the tactical level, i.e. managing the complexity and unpredictability 
characterizing traffic situations, require a range of executive functions such as multitasking, 
inhibition, initiation and immediate decision making (Lundquist, 2001) in addition to self-
monitoring of driving performance and awareness of one’s cognitive function (Lundquist & 
Alinder, 2007). Self-monitoring requires substantial attention to both the task and own 
performance, and it has been suggested that impairments in executive components involving 
control over complex attention, or multitasking, can contribute to reduced self-awareness 
(Hart et al., 2005). As such, impairments in executive function itself constitute a significant 
threat to safe driving performance on the tactical level as it relates to emergent awareness, i.e. 
reduced ability to self-monitor as problems occur.  
Patients lacking anticipatory awareness may fail to use the awareness of their own 
cognitive impairments to predict possible difficulties that are likely to occur (Toglia & Kirk, 
2000). Thus, impaired anticipatory awareness affects the ability to develop coping strategies 
on the strategic level, such as not driving in darkness or avoiding rush-hour traffic (Lundquist 
& Alinder, 2007). However, strategic planning also relies on executive function; thus, 
impairments in executive functions and self-awareness both constitute a threat to the use of 
compensatory strategies at tactical and strategic levels when driving (Lundberg, Caneman, 
Samuelsson, Hakamies-Blomquist & Almkvist, 2003). A study conducted by Schanke et al. 
(2008), showed that a group of stroke patients had changed their driving patterns and reduced 
their driving post-injury, while no changes were found in driving patterns in the TBI group. 
However, there were no significant differences in perceived driving skills between the groups. 
These results may indicate a higher degree of risky driving behaviours within the TBI group, 
and might reflect a possible lack of compensation strategies in the TBI group in spite of self-
awareness as to the cognitive deficits. In addition, the members of the TBI group had different 
premorbid characteristics and were younger than the stroke group. In other words, self-
awareness is essential, but apparently not sufficient for safe driving. Furthermore, the use of 
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compensatory strategies requires both awareness of disabilities and willingness to cope, and 
are, by such, closely related to psychological factors (Lundquist & Alinder, 2007). A study by 
Ownsworth et al. (2002) found that patients who presented their personality in a favourably 
light were more likely to use denial as a coping strategy after brain injury. The social 
desirability level was not related to personality disturbance post-injury, indicating that pre-
morbid factors might be of importance in denial. Although the impact of these factors is 
beyond the scope of this paper, they may affect the development of compensational strategies 
related to driving, which confirms the importance of including pre-morbid factors and 
psychological factors in the basis for understanding self-awareness.  
Considering the complex composition of higher order cognitive functions underlying 
safe driving on the tactical and strategic level, executive functions and self-awareness are 
highly relevant aspects that should be of consideration in fitness-to-drive assessments. 
Furthermore, another concept, namely self-awareness of executive functions, seems 
reasonable to take into account. However, no previous studies have, to the author’s 
knowledge, investigated self-awareness of executive function in the context of fitness-to-drive 
assessments. Therefore, the Behaviour Rating Inventory of Executive Function-Adult version 
(BRIEF-A) was included in the current study as a measurement of both self-reported 
executive impairment, and a measure of self-awareness of executive function. The method is 
described in section 1.3.  
 
1.3 Measuring executive functions and Self-
Awareness 
Generally, the study- and assessment of impaired executive function face inherent challenges 
in terms of valid and accurate assessment. Executive functions are part of a complex system 
consisting of cognitive, affective, motivational and behavioral components (Bivona et al., 
2008), and impairment in any component process is difficult to rule out (Chan, Shum, 
Toulopoulou & Chen, 2008). Consequently, there is no unified test for executive functions, 
and the existing neuropsychological tests have been proposed to measure single components 
(Bivona et al., 2008). Another major issue related to neuropsychological tests of executive 
function is ecological validity, which refers to the generalizability of results from test 
performance to performance in the real world (Chaytor & Schmitter-Edgecombe, 2003). 
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Executive functions coordinate one’s behavioural and cognitive abilities with the demands of 
real world situations (Gioia & Isquith, 2004). Thus, neuropsychological tests of executive 
function have been questioned (Gioia & Isquith, 2004), as the assessment situation in itself 
provides structure, organizing and monitoring. Thus, the test situation may “take over” the 
patients’ executive functions (Stuss & Alexander, 2000), which reduces the possible 
observation of critical behaviours associated with impaired executive functions (Stuss, 1987). 
In this regard, many patients perform within normal range on tests of executive function, but 
experience substantial difficulties in their lives outside the test-situation (Stuss & Buckle, 
1992). Considering the importance of executive functions in safe driving, this is a cause of 
concern in fitness-to-drive assessments. Accordingly, some researchers stress the importance 
of developing new measures of executive functions based on an ecological approach. The 
Behaviour Rating Inventory of Executive Function-Adult version (BRIEF-A), a self-report 
questionnaire measuring executive function in daily life, was developed from an ecological 
perspective (Gioia & Isquith, 2004). BRIEF-A is presumed to detect executive impairment 
which might not be detected through neuropsychological tests (Løvstad et al., in press). Thus, 
the use of BRIEF-A has been argued to increase ecological validity in assessments of 
executive function (Gioia & Isquith, 2004). So far, few studies have examined the relationship 
between BRIEF-A and neuropsychological measures. The existing research report few, or 
none significant correlations, indicating that BRIEF-A taps different constructs within 
executive functions than the neuropsychological tests measure (Anderson et al., 2002; 
McAuley, Chen, Goos, Schachar & Crosbie, 2010; Løvstad et al., in press). However, the 
ecological validity of BRIEF-A itself is not yet empirically established. In addition, a study 
revealed robust correlations (r =, 64-.98, p <0,001) between the BRIEF-A Global Executive 
Composite score and the Global severity Index of the Symptom checklist 90 revised (SCL-90-
R, a widely used questionnaire measuring psychological problems and symptoms of 
psychopathology), indicating that BRIEF-A might be associated with general emotional 
distress, and thus may not be specific to executive function (Løvstad et al., in press). 
Unlike domain-specific cognitive functions, measures of self-awareness are often 
derived from observations, questionnaires or interviews. A number of scales and 
measurements have been developed to assess self-awareness in brain-injured patients, and 
assessment designs vary from semi-structured interviews to self-report questionnaires (Bach 
& David, 2006). The most frequently used method for measuring self-awareness involves 
comparison of patients’ self-rating with another measure considered more objective (Fleming 
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et al., 1996). Deaton (1986) differentiated between the following three such methods of 
assessment: (1) the discrepancy between patients’ self-rating and the families’ rating of the 
patient; (2) the discrepancy between patients’ self-rating and the rehabilitation staffs’ rating of 
the patient; and (3) The discrepancy between the patients’ estimates of their own abilities and 
performance on neuropsychological tests.  
The Behaviour Rating Inventory of Executive Function, adult version (BRIEF-A) 
includes both self-reporting and family/clinician rating forms, which enables the calculation 
of discrepancy scores. Considering how self-awareness is associated with metacognition and 
executive function, these discrepancy scores might shed light on level of self-awareness of 
executive function. A commonly used measure of impaired self-awareness is the Awareness 
Questionnaire (AQ), developed by Sherer, Bergloff, Boake, High Jr. and Levin (1998) as a 
measure of impaired self-awareness after TBI. The AQ enables the use of a total discrepancy 
score as a measurement of the patients’ degree of self-awareness, and can further differentiate 
between aspects of awareness by the three subscales divided in to Motor/Sensory, Cognition 
and Behavioural/Affective (Sherer, Hart & Nick, 2003). Thus, the combination of these two 
questionnaires may provide information about several aspects of self-awareness, including 
self-awareness of executive function.  
Furthermore, investigating the relationship between executive functions and self-
awareness is of interest, as previous studies lack consistent findings. While some studies have 
found significant correlations between metacognitive self-awareness and some components of 
executive function, such as flexibility, problem solving, inhibition of response and high 
percentage of perseverative errors (Bivona et al., 2008; Circuli et al., 2010), other studies 
have failed to demonstrate correlations between executive dysfunction and reduced self-
awareness (Back & David, 2006). As neuropsychological tests do not measure self-awareness 
directly, impaired self-awareness can be difficult to detect for clinicians due to the limited 
information about the patients’ premorbid function, personality and everyday behaviour. 
Although the importance of self-awareness for safe driving after brain injury is highly 
emphasized in the literature, measurements of self-awareness are not an established part of 
fitness-to-drive assessments in Norway. Consequently, standard neuropsychological 
assessments may not only fail to reveal the various impairments in higher order cognitive 
abilities, but the patients’ self-awareness of such impairments may also stay undiscovered.   
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The inclusion of discrepancy scores on both BRIEF-A and Awareness Questionnaire 
(AQ) in the current study provides a comprehensive measure of self-awareness where several 
aspects are included. The applied measures of self-awareness are based on the operational 
concept, assuming that the discrepancy between patients’ self-rating and relatives’ ratings can 
provide a measurement of impaired self-awareness (Bach and David, 2006). It is assumed that 
relatives’ ratings contain valid information as their observations of the patient is far more 
frequent than the clinicians’, and includes aspects of premorbid function that clinicians have 
limited access to. However, the use of self-reporting and discrepancy ratings does provide 
methodological issues, especially in the setting of fitness-to-drive assessments, which 
provides a context where one would expect some patients and relatives to underreport deficits. 
These issues are discussed in section 4.1. 
 
1.4 The purpose of the present study: 
Objectives and research hypotheses 
This paper seeks to explore the additional value of measuring self-awareness in cognitive 
assessments for holding a drivers’ license. To the authors’ knowledge, no previous studies 
have included BRIEF-A as a measure of self-awareness of executive function in relation to 
fitness-to-drive assessments, and only few studies have included the Awareness Questionnaire 
(AQ) when investigating factors relevant for safe driving (Griffen et al., 2011; Scott, 2010). 
Objective I: The first objective of the study is to investigate the concurrent validity of 
BRIEF-A as a measure of self-awareness of executive function, i.e. whether the BRIEF-A 
discrepancy scores correlates with the discrepancy scores of the Awareness Questionnaire. 
Hypothesis 1: The discrepancy scores on BRIEF-A and AQ will correlate, supporting the 
concurrent validity of BRIEF-A as a measure of self-awareness of executive function. 
Objective II: Second, the potential additional value of the questionnaires is examined, 
i.e. whether AQ and BRIEF-A measure other factors than the neuropsychological tests do. In 
accordance with the research showing that patients’ more accurately assess their own 
limitations regarding physical constraints than higher order cognitive functions (Bach & 
David, 2006; Prigatano, 1996), it is hypothesized that patients’ ratings on the Motor/Sensory 
subscale on AQ will be related to performance on tests of sensomotoric coordination. No 
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additional correlations are expected. Lack of significant correlations between BRIEF-A and 
cognitive tests is expected in accordance with previous research (Anderson et al., 2002; 
McAuley et al., 2010; Løvstad et al., in press).    
Hypothesis 2.1: Patients’ ratings on the Motor/Sensory subscale on AQ will be related to 
performance on tests of sensomotoric coordination.  
Hypothesis 2.2: Lack of significant correlations between BRIEF-A and cognitive tests is 
expected. 
Objective III: The third objective is to investigate whether the measures of self-
awareness were related to outcome (fulfilling the criteria for driving or not) i.e. if the 
measures can predict the outcome in the conclusions for or against holding a drivers’ license 
in the current sample.  
Hypothesis 3: The measures of self-awareness cannot predict the outcome, as 
neuropsychological tests are the basis of the decisions and these do not include measures of 
self-awareness.  
Objective IV:  Finally, the study examines the relationship between location of injury 
(left, right or multifocal) and both outcome (fulfilling the criteria for driving or not) and self-
awareness. Impaired self-awareness has been associated with right-hemisphere lesions in 
stroke patients (Starkstein, et al., 2010), and multifocal lesions involving prefrontal cortex in 
TBI patients (Consentino & Stern, 2005, Sherer et al., 2005). 
Hypothesis 4: Patients with multifocal or right hemisphere injuries will score higher in terms 
of impaired self-awareness compared to patients with left hemisphere injuries. 
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2 Method 
The data were obtained from an ongoing PhD study by Rike (2011), approved by the Helsinki 
Declaration and Vancouver rules and the Regional Committee for Medical research ethics 
(REC), South East, Norway. All data were made anonymous for use in the present study. 
2.1 Sample and procedure 
The sample consisted of 89 inpatients at Sunnaas Rehabilitation Hospital with stroke or TBI, 
mainly inhabitants` in the geographical area of the South-Eastern Norway Regional Health 
Authority. The patients were referred for fitness-to-drive assessments between March 2010 
and March 2011 and those who fulfilled the inclusion criteria were consecutively included in 
the study. The Inclusion criteria were cerebrovaskular accident (stroke) or traumatic brain 
injury (TBI) confirmed by Computerized Tomography (CT) or Magnetic Resonance Imaging 
(MRI), minimum 3 months post injury, and in need for a driving assessment. Exclusion 
criteria were extensive aphasia due to brain injury causing potential validity problems during 
testing, dementia or other somatic or neurological illnesses that might affect cognition, and 
severe psychiatric illness. 
Table 1. Demographic and medical characteristics of subjects.  
 
 
 
Stroke   TBI   Total
N  (%) 58 (65) 31 (35) 89
Male % 74,1 80,7 77
Age, Mean (SD ) 57,7 (12,9) 47,4 (16,2) 54,1 (14,9)
Education in years, Mean (SD ) 12,4 (3,1) 12,9 (2,6) 12,6 (2,9)
Months since injury, Mean (SD ) 23,8 (28,5) 19,8 (24,7) 22,4 (27,2)
Localization of injury N  (%):
          Left 21 (36,8) 7 (23,3) 28 (31,5)
          Right 25 (43,9) 4 (13,3) 29 (32,6)
          Multifocal 6 (10,5) 19 (63,3) 25 28,1)
          Cerebellum pons 5 (8,8) 0 (0) 5 (5,6)
          Total 57 (98) 30 (97) 87 (97,8)
Note. Missing data on localization of injury: 2 (2, 2 %)
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As apparent from Table 1, the group of patients diagnosed with stroke was somewhat larger 
than the TBI group. 77 % of the participants were male. The mean education level was in 
excess of 12 years. Months since injury were on average 22, 38. The majority of patients with 
multifocal injury had suffered from TBI, while the majority of the patients with left and right 
hemisphere injury had suffered from stroke. All patients with cerebellum/pons injury had 
suffered from stroke. 
Table 2. Localization of injury and decision of resuming a drivers' license. 
 
Table 2 shows the number and percentage of patients in the groups categorized by localization 
of injury that fulfilled criteria for driving or not. 
The participants underwent a neuropsychological and medical assessment (see Sundet, 
Goeffeng & Hofft, 1995 for full procedure). The patients passing the medical and 
neuropsychological examinations, or when doubt on ability to drive safely, were referred to 
an on-road driving test conducted between March 2010 and March 2011. In addition to 
standardized neuropsychological tests, two questionnaires, Awareness Questionnaire (AQ) 
and the Behavior Rating Inventory of Executive function, Adult version (BRIEF-A) were 
administered to both patients and a significant other/close relative of the patient. To minimize 
validity threats in terms of underreporting and social desirability, all participants were 
explicitly made aware that Awareness Questionnaire and BRIEF-A were not part of the 
conclusion. A professional driving instructor and an occupational therapist conducted the on-
road driving test. A physician and an experienced consultant in clinical neuropsychology 
 
Localization of injury: No Yes
   Left n 12 16 28
% 42,9% 57,1% 100,0%
   Right n 19 10 29
% 65,5% 34,5% 100,0%
   Multifocal n 12 13 25
% 48,0% 52,0% 100,0%
   Cerebellum Pons n 0 5 5
% 0,0 % 100% 100%
   Total n 43 44 87
% 52,4% 47,6% 100,0%
Note. Missing data on localization of injury: 2 (2, 2 %)
Fulfilled criteria for driving
Total
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executed the conclusion (pass/fail). The results were reported to country authorities for final 
decisions.   
2.2 Assessment 
2.2.1 Neuropsychological measures 
The following neuropsychological test battery was administered in one or more sessions (See 
Lezak, 2004 and Sundet et al., 1995 for detailed description of the test battery used), 
including measures of Visual attention/reaction time: Tachistoscope, React (Gianutsos). 
Sensomotoric tempo/coordination: Grooved Pegboard. Attention/psychomotor tempo: Trail 
Making Test part A (TMT A, Halstead Reitan), Serial Digit Modalities Test (SDMT, oral and 
written version), Stroop Color-Word Interference 1 & 2 (D-KEFS), Digit span (WAIS III), 
Executive functions: Trail Making Test part B (TMT B, Halstead-Reitan), Stroop Color-Word 
Interference 3 & 4 (D-KEFS). General intellectual capacity: Similarities, Block design 
(Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale III, WAIS III). 
2.2.2 Measures of Self-Awareness and Executive function 
The Awareness Questionnaire (AQ) (Sherer, Bergloff, Boake et al., 1998, Norwegian 
translation by Løvstad, Solbakk, Schanke & Schanke, 2007) includes 17 items where the 
patients’ rate their current functional abilities in comparison to their abilities pre-injury. The 
items are rated on a Likert scale ranging from one (much worse) to five (much better), and 
scores can range from 17 to 85, where a score of 51 implies that the patient is rating his or her 
function level as ‘about the same’ as his or her function level pre-injury. The subtraction of 
the family ratings from patient self-ratings provides a calculated measure of impaired self-
awareness. The discrepancy scores can range from -68 to 68. Higher discrepancy scores 
indicate greater degrees of impaired self-awareness. AQ includes three subscales found 
through factor analysis: Motor/Sensory (SM, including four items), Cognition (Cog, including 
seven items) and Behavioural/Affective (BA, including six items). Reliability studies have 
demonstrated internal consistency-based measures (Cronbach’s alpha) of 0.88 for both patient 
and family ratings, and studies have confirmed that TBI patients tend to rate themselves as 
better functioning than their families or clinician rates them (Sherer, Boake et al., 1998). 
Although the Awareness Questionnaire was originally developed for measuring impaired self-
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awareness after TBI, it has been shown to be reliable and valid for use in other populations 
such as stroke (Sherer, Bergloff, Levin, et al., 1998). Examples of items: Patient-form ‘3. How 
well do you get along with people now as compared to before your injury?’ (example from 
the corresponding relative form: ‘3. How well does the patient get along with people now as 
compared to before his/her injury?’),‘4. How well can you do on tests that measure thinking 
and memory skills now as compared to before your injury?’, ‘9. How good is your 
coordination now as compared to before your injury?’ (see Appendix 1.1. for patient form and 
Appendix 1.2. for relative form).   
The Behaviour Rating Inventory of Executive Function, adult version (BRIEF-A, 18-
90 years) (Roth, Isquith & Gioia, 2005, Norwegian translation by Nicholas & Solbakk, 2006) 
state 75 behaviours to be rated as never, sometimes or often being a problem over the past four 
weeks. Nine scales corresponding to domains of executive function are included. Sores on the 
scales result in two broad indexes: Behavioral Regulation Index (BRI, including the scales 
inhibit, shift, emotional control and self-monitoring) and Metacognition Index (MI, including 
the scales initiate, working memory, plan-organize, task monitor and organisation of 
materials), and an overall summary score, Global Executive composite (GEC). Three validity 
scales are included (Negativity, Inconsistency, and Infrequency). The normative sample 
includes 1,136 adults from a wide range of racial/ethnic backgrounds, geographic regions and 
educational backgrounds. Profiles for diagnostic groups are presented in the manual. Studies 
have demonstrated internal consistency-based measures (Cronbach’s alpha) of 0.93-0.96 on 
indexes and overall score, and 0.73-0.90 on clinical scales. Examples of items: ‘8. I have 
trouble changing from one activity or task to another’, ‘42. I get emotionally upset easily’, 
‘70. I don’t think about consequences before doing something’, ‘73. I am impulsive’ (patient 
and relative forms are not included in Appendices due to copyright).   
2.3 Statistical Analyzes 
Statistical analyses were made using SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) 
version 20.0. The analyses preferably used were Person product moment correlations, t-test 
for dependent and independent samples, corresponding non-parametric tests, cross-tabulation 
analyses and ANOVA. The analyses are featured in relation to the tables.  
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3 Results 
3.1 Awareness Questionnaire and BRIEF-A 
3.1.1 Descriptive statistics of the Awareness Questionnaire 
Table 3. Mean and standard deviation of the Awareness Questionnaire (AQ) 
  N Min Max Mean SD t-value
1)
 
Patients’ scores 
     
 
Total 87 29 58 46,3 5,7 -7,75*** 
MS 87 5 13 10,8 1,5 -7,47*** 
COG 87 9 23 18,9 2,8 -7,10*** 
BA 87 8 24 16,5 2,6 -5,25*** 
Relatives' scores       
Total 69 26 74 45,6 7,1 -6,35*** 
MS 69 6 13 10,5 1,7 -7,77*** 
COG 69 10 33 18,8 3,5 -5,24*** 
BA 69 9 28 16,3 2,9 -4,78*** 
       
Discrepancy scores      t-value
2)
 
Total 69 -19 23 -0,9 6,6 1,11 
MS 69 -5 4 -0,3 1,4 1,92 
COG 69 -10 11 -0,3 3,2 0,65 
BA 69 -7 10 -0,3 2,9 0,86 
1) Difference from score on scales natural midpoint (Total=51, MS=12, COG=21, and BA=18), One-sample t-test 
2) T-test for dependent samples 
* p <.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
Note. MS: Motor/Sensory, Cog: Cognition, BA: Behavioral/Affective 
 
Apparent in Table 3, the patients reported themselves as a little worse than pre-injury as 
apparent in the significant differences between mean patient scores and the Awareness 
Questionnaire scales’ natural mid-point value (Table 3)1. However, the range in scores shows 
that some patients report themselves as much worse, and some even better than pre-injury. 
The relatives’ ratings are fairly similar to the patients’ ratings, and the average discrepancy 
scores consequently relatively low with no significant differences. However, the distribution 
                                                 
1
 The scales natural mid-point represents an average score of 3 on all items, hence no difference in functioning 
after injury as compared to before. 
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does include some cases with high discrepancy scores, illustrated in Figure 1 (see Appendix 
2.1. for distribution of subscales).  
3.1.2 Descriptive statistics of BRIEF-A  
 
Table 4. Mean and standard deviation of BRIEF-A 
 N Min Max Mean SD 
 
Patients’ scores 
     
 
BR 84 36 73 46,9 9,1  
MT 84 36 70 47,5 9,1  
GEC 84 35 68 47,0 9,2  
Relatives' scores       
BR 68 37 72 47,7 8,9  
MC 68 36 79 50,0 11,0  
GEC 68 35 73 48,9 9,9  
       
Discrepancy scores      t-value
1)
 
BR 68 -34 20 -1,0 11,7 -0,58 
MC 68 -52 28 -2,6 17,4 -1,79 
GEC 68 -68 48 -2,9 26,0 -1,33 
1) t-test for dependent samples 
Note. BR: Behavior regulation Index, MI: Metacognition Index, GEC: Global Executive Composite 
 
 
Apparent in Table 4, the average scores on the Behavioral rating inventory of executive 
function-adult (BRIEF-A) were well below clinical cut off, defined as a T score of 65 or 
greater according to the BRIEF-A manual. This accounted for both patients’ and relatives’ 
ratings. The differences between patients’ and relatives’ scores were not statistically 
significant. However, the distribution includes some cases of high discrepancy scores, 
illustrated in Figure 1 (see Appendix 2.2. for distribution of index scores). 
 
Figure 1. Distribution of AQ Total and BRIEF-A Global Executive Composite (GEC) discrepancy scores.   
 
 
 
                       AQ TOTAL                                                                      BRIEF GEC 
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3.1.3 The interrelationship between Awareness Questionnaire 
and BRIEF-A 
Pearson product-moment correlation was used to examine the interrelationship between the 
Awareness Questionnaire and BRIEF-A.  
 
Table 5. The interrelationship between the Awareness Questionnaire (AQ) and BRIEF-A 
 
 
Moderate to low correlations were found between the Awareness Questionnaire (AQ) and 
BRIEF-A, with the strongest correlations between the relatives’ scores on the two 
questionnaires, as shown in Table 5. While the correlations on the patients’ scores on the two 
questionnaires were weak and non-significant, the relationship between the discrepancy 
scores showed moderate significant correlations. 
 
 
N  = 84 for Patients' scores, 68 for Relatives'/Discrepancy scores
P BRI P MI P GEC R BRI R MI R GEC Dis BRI Dis MI Dis GEC
AQ
P Total -,295 ** -,423 ** -,388 ** -,331 ** -,318 ** -,344 ** ,115 ,077 ,111
P MS -,020 -,119 -,080 -,180 -,164 -,177 ,096 ,035 ,088
P COG -,301 ** -,427 ** -,393 ** -,287 * -,314 ** -,325 ** ,085 ,083 ,093
P BA -,317 ** -,408 ** -,388 ** -,337 ** -,293 * -,332 ** ,111 ,067 ,099
R Total -,066 -,094 -,084 -,585 ** -,561 ** -,629 ** ,490 ** ,494 ** ,518 **
R MS -,065 -,084 -,079 -,446 ** -,475 ** -,508 ** ,366 ** ,424 ** ,442 **
R COG -,053 -,104 -,084 -,493 ** -,478 ** -,535 ** ,408 ** ,399 ** ,421 **
R BA -,061 -,056 -,059 -,582 ** -,524 ** -,603 ** ,497 ** ,487 ** ,509 **
Dis Total ,151 ,216 ,200 -,352 ** -,336 ** -,388 ** ,433 ** ,471 ** ,468 **
Dis MS ,020 ,121 ,083 -,316 ** -,366 ** -,391 ** ,316 ** ,449 ** ,411 **
Dis Cog ,142 ,176 ,172 -,325 ** -,287 * -,342 ** ,392 ** ,384 ** ,401 **
Dis BA ,179 ,239 * ,225 -,289 * -,269 * -,314 ** ,399 ** ,427 ** ,422 **
** Correlations is significant at the 0,01 level (2-tailed)
* Correlations is significant at the 0,05 level (2-tailed)
Note. AQ: MS: Motor/Sensory, Cog: Cognition, BA: Behavioral/Affective 
BRIEF: BRI: Behavior regulation Index, MI: Metacognition Index, GEC: Global Executive Composite
P: Patients’ scores, R: Relatives’ scores, Dis: Discrepancy scores
         BRIEF
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3.1.4 Patients’ and relatives’ ratings on Awareness 
Questionnaire and BRIEF-A 
 
The relationship between patients’ and relatives’ ratings on the Awareness Questionnaire 
(AQ) and BRIEF-A, respectively, were examined using Person product-moment correlation.  
Table 6. The relationship between patients’ and relatives’ ratings on Awareness Questionnaire (AQ). 
N = 69 
     
    Relatives Total MS Cog BA 
Patients           
Total  ,487
**
    
MS  ,277
*
 ,605
**
   
Cog  ,478
**
 ,224 ,497
**
  
BA   ,433
**
 ,268
*
 ,394
**
 ,430
**
 
**p < .01  
* p <.05  
Note. MS: Motor/Sensory, Cog: Cognition, BA: Behavioral/Affective 
 
Table 7. The relationship between patients’ and relatives’ ratings on BRIEF-A. 
n  = 67 
    
  Relatives BRI MI GEC 
Patients         
BRI  ,255
*
 
  
MI  ,130 ,274
*
 
 
GEC   ,192 ,220 ,221 
**p < .01  
* p <.05  
Note. BRI: Behavior regulation Index, MI: Metacognition Index, GEC: Global Executive Composite 
 
 
As apparent from Table 6 and 7, moderate to strong correlations were found between the 
patients’ and relatives’ scores on the equivalent AQ subscales. Consistently lower correlations 
were found between the patients’ and relatives’ scores on BRIEF-A, indicating differences in 
rating on the two questionnaires. 
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3.2 The relationship between AQ/BRIEF-A and 
neuropsychological tests 
3.2.1 Awareness Questionnaire and neuropsychological tests 
Pearson product moment correlations were used to examine the relationship between the 
Awareness Questionnaire and the neuropsychological tests.  
Table 8. The relationship between Awareness Questionnaire (AQ) and neuropsychological tests 
 
N  (61-89)
AQ
Neuropsychological tests: Total   MS Cog   BA Total   MS Cog    BA Total MS Cog  BA
Visual Attention/Reaction time
     Tachistoscope Simple
               Total ,124 ,166 ,082 ,092 ,122 ,274 * ,044 ,090 ,003 ,081 -,034 ,004
               Left ,179 ,277 ** ,102 ,127 ,154 ,304 * ,046 ,147 ,001 ,037 -,048 ,036
               Middle ,135 ,054 ,133 ,125 -,044 ,062 -,059 -,072 -,093 -,011 -,097 -,100
               Right -,126 -,107 -,101 -,108 ,156 ,205 ,153 ,080 ,156 ,250 * ,147 ,070
               False positives ,086 ,051 ,110 ,044 ,025 -,033 ,043 ,028 ,018 ,029 -,027 ,055
     Tachistoscope Complex
               Total ,083 ,080 ,055 ,079 ,210 ,254 * ,172 ,162 ,120 ,109 ,126 ,082
               Left ,111 ,117 ,085 ,087 ,268 * ,308 ** ,190 ,249 * ,198 ,145 ,154 ,210
               Middle -,025 -,003 -,068 ,020 -,172 -,126 -,139 -,182 -,181 -,152 -,109 -,216
               Right ,042 ,032 ,030 ,043 ,195 ,210 ,191 ,127 ,119 ,129 ,148 ,045
               False positives ,202 ,249 * ,094 ,203 ,193 ,272 * ,129 ,162 ,007 ,025 ,042 -,040
     React
               Left -,127 ,002 -,137 -,135 -,083 ,038 -,032 -,185 -,064 ,048 -,007 -,160
               Middle -,104 ,046 -,148 -,099 -,218 -,077 -,197 -,253 * -,189 -,181 -,123 -,203
               Right -,099 -,039 -,096 -,093 -,283 * -,268 * -,207 -,290 * -,237 -,205 -,177 -,244 *
Sensomotoric 
tempo/coordination     Grooved Pegb ard DH ,112 ,354 ** ,033 ,026 ,282 * ,367 ** ,192 ,249 * ,125 ,056 ,085 ,160
     Grooved Pegboard NDH ,124 ,489 ** -,013 ,027 ,176 ,357 ** ,090 ,136 ,032 -,160 ,038 ,102
Attention/psychomotor tempo
     TMT A ,237 * ,219 * ,249 * ,132 ,188 ,153 ,178 ,157 -,010 -,123 -,027 ,066
     SDMT Oral ,131 ,188 ,166 ,004 ,140 ,181 ,124 ,088 ,015 -,027 -,038 ,087
     SDMT Written ,110 ,136 ,140 ,018 ,122 ,215 ,105 ,050 ,049 ,114 -,010 ,066
     Stroop 1 ,043 ,046 ,126 -,066 ,075 ,053 ,097 ,037 -,012 -,042 -,049 ,045
     Stroop 2 ,204 ,139 ,266 * ,090 ,245 * ,155 ,269 * ,189 ,058 -,012 ,049 ,083
     Digit span -,130 -,139 -,035 -,171 -,060 -,093 -,021 -,069 ,083 ,065 ,041 ,111
Executive function
     TMT B ,197 ,157 ,246 * ,083 ,179 ,184 ,170 ,127 ,045 ,000 -,013 ,116
     Stroop 3 ,076 -,012 ,141 ,027 ,061 -,052 ,114 ,040 ,016 -,065 ,016 ,052
     Stroop 4 ,116 -,003 ,204 ,042 ,065 -,068 ,111 ,062 -,014 -,078 -,045 ,054
General intellectual capasity
     Block design ,007 ,108 ,012 -,058 -,053 -,028 -,034 -,071 -,096 -,142 -,112 -,025
     Similarities -,102 -,182 -,040 -,078 -,016 -,163 ,025 ,024 ,026 ,069 -,013 ,039
** Correlations is significant at the 0,01 level (2-tailed)
* Correlations is significant at the 0,05 level (2-tailed)
Note. DH: Dominant hand, NDH: Non-dominant hand, TMT: Trail Making Test, SDMT: Serial Digit Modalities Test.
MS: Motor/sensory, Cog: Cognition, BA: Bahavioral/Affective. Reversed scale on React  
Patients' scores Relatives' scores Discrepancy scores
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As apparent in Table 8, the strongest correlations were found between Grooved Pegboard and 
both patients and relatives’ ratings on the Motor/Sensory (MS) subscale. Patients rating 
themselves as ‘about the same’ as pre-injury performed better on the measure of sensomotoric 
coordination than the patients’ rating themselves as worse than pre-injury. In general, weak 
and non-significant correlations were found on all other tests. The significant correlations 
showed that low ratings on the Awareness Questionnaire were related to poor performance on 
various tests. A  predominance of correlations were found between the MS subscale on 
Awareness Questionnaire and various cognitive tests, indicating a relationship between this 
subscale and some of the cognitive tests applied in the fitness-to-drive assessments. The 
relatives’ ratings correlated somewhat stronger with the various tests than the patient’s 
ratings, indicating more accurate evaluation of the patients’ function. The correlations 
between the neuropsychological tests and the discrepancy scores were non-significant, with 
the exception of a weak correlation between Tachistoscope Simple right and the discrepancy 
score on the MS subscale, and a weak correlation between React right and the discrepancy 
scores on the BA subscale. No significant correlations were found between ratings on the 
Awareness Questionnaire and measures of IQ. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
30 
 
3.2.2 BRIEF-A and neuropsychological tests 
Pearson product moment correlations were used to examine the interrelationship between 
BRIEF-A and neuropsychological tests.  
Table 9. The relationship between BRIEF-A and neuropsychological tests 
 
 
N (65-84)
BRIEF-A
Neuropsychological tests: BRI MI GEC BRI  MI  GEC  BRI  MI GEC
Visual Attention/Reaction time
     Tachistoscope Simple
               Total -,106 -,121 -,123 -,091 -,096 -,099 ,048 ,020 ,016
               Left -,097 -,146 -,136 -,064 -,100 -,091 ,018 ,006 -,011
               Middle -,093 -,096 -,102 -,001 ,032 ,022 -,052 -,092 -,070
               Right -,029 ,033 ,011 -,207 -,179 -,202 ,232 ,211 ,206
               False positives ,086 ,066 ,084 ,032 -,044 -,011 ,042 ,103 ,084
     Tachistoscope Complex
               Total -,058 -,108 -,098 -,062 -,087 -,084 ,087 ,016 ,029
               Left -,033 -,124 -,095 -,097 -,096 -,104 ,136 ,028 ,074
               Middle ,014 ,046 ,031 ,184 ,222 ,223 -,104 -,160 -,119
               Right -,086 -,098 -,102 -,112 -,177 -,163 ,071 ,086 ,040
               False positives -,047 -,086 -,072 -,276 * -,189 -,241 * ,207 ,106 ,154
     React
               Left ,118 ,034 ,073 ,027 ,045 ,038 -,046 -,076 -,030
               Middle ,103 -,039 ,024 ,146 ,152 ,162 -,158 -,231 -,138
               Right ,138 ,063 ,097 ,154 ,224 ,211 -,145 -,205 -,148
Sensomotoric tempo/coordination
     Grooved Pegboard DH ,086 ,070 ,094 -,052 -,172 -,134 ,138 ,216 ,181
     Grooved Pegboard NDH ,028 ,077 ,066 -,061 -,047 -,051 ,148 ,140 ,155
Attention/psychomotor tempo
     TMT A -,027 -,023 -,025 ,047 -,009 ,017 -,002 ,013 -,002
     SDMT Or ,086 ,134 ,121 ,013 ,007 ,010 ,106 ,124 ,082
     SDMT Wr ,034 ,073 ,061 ,002 -,093 -,060 ,103 ,204 ,135
     Stroop 1 ,047 -,027 ,008 -,020 -,092 -,068 ,102 ,113 ,065
     Stroop 2 ,050 -,061 -,012 -,111 -,239 -,204 ,175 ,216 ,178
     Digit span -,041 ,083 ,035 -,003 ,149 ,101 ,041 -,047 -,054
Executive function
     TMT B -,011 ,011 ,005 -,009 -,015 -,012 ,059 ,071 ,051
     Stroop 3 ,058 ,036 ,047 ,008 -,099 -,057 ,137 ,164 ,110
     Stroop 4 ,038 -,011 ,008 ,033 -,033 -,003 ,086 ,065 ,033
General intellectual capasity
     Block design -,042 -,015 -,031 ,135 ,130 ,145 -,130 -,131 -,164
     Similarities -,072 ,029 -,015 ,011 ,065 ,046 -,054 -,034 -,059
** Correlations is significant at the 0,01 level (2-tailed)
* Correlations is significant at the 0,05 level (2-tailed)
Note. DH: Dominant hand, NDH: Non-dominant hand, TMT: Trail Making Test, SDMT: Serial Digit Modalities Test.
BRI: Behavior Regulation Index, MI: Metacognition Index, GEC: Global Executive Composite. Reversed scale on React 
Patients' scores Relatives' scores Discrepancy scores
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Apparent from Table 9, no significant correlations were found except a positive, weak 
correlation between Tachistoscope Complex False positives and Relatives’ ratings on the 
Behavioral Regulation index (BRI) and the Global Executive Composite (GEC). 
  
3.3 Group differences: Patients fulfilling criteria 
for driving and patients not fulfilling criteria for 
driving.  
3.3.1 The relationship between neuropsychological tests and 
outcome  
Comparisons of results on neuropsychological tests between the group of patients that 
fulfilled the criteria for driving and the group of patients that did not fulfill the criteria for 
driving were made using independent samples t-tests.  
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Table 10. Mean difference on neuropsychological tests between the group of patients fulfilling criteria for 
driving and the group of patients not fulfilling the criteria for driving.  
 
The group that fulfilled the criteria for driving performed significantly better on all of the 
neuropsychological tests with the exception of two Tachistoscope subtests, React left and 
middle, and similarities, illustrated in Table 10. Non-parametric test conducted on 
Tachistoscope and React due to skewedness, showed corresponding results with the exception 
of lack of significant difference on Tach com FP, and React left showing a significant 
difference within the two groups. 
 
Neuropsychological tests n Mean SD n Mean SD p
Visual Attention/Reaction time
     Tachistoscope Simple
               Total 42 49,1 5,6 46 53,3 1,9 0,00 **
               Left 42 20,7 4,0 46 22,8 1,1 0,00 **
               Middle 42 6,5 2,0 46 7,6 1,1 0,00 **
               Right 42 22,0 2,2 46 23,0 0,1 0,00 **
               False positives 42 0,1 0,4 46 0,0 0,0 0,10
     Tachistoscope Complex
               Total 42 34,2 9,1 46 41,7 5,7 0,00 **
               Left 43 14,3 5,1 46 18,0 3,3 0,00 **
               Middle 43 5,2 2,2 46 5,5 2,2 0,45
               Right 43 15,0 5,3 46 18,2 3,2 0,00 **
               False positives 42 3,0 4,1 46 1,3 1,8 0,02 *
     React
               Left 42 0,4 0,2 45 0,3 0,1 0,07
               Middle 42 0,3 0,1 45 0,3 0,1 0,12
               Right 42 0,4 0,1 45 0,3 0,0 0,01 **
Sensomotoric tempo/coordination
     Grooved Pegboard DH 40 38,6 11,3 45 47,8 12,8 0,00 **
     Grooved Pegboard NDH 36 37,4 9,2 38 45,7 11,0 0,00 **
Attention/psychomotor tempo
     TMT A 42 37,9 9,5 45 49,5 9,4 0,00 **
     SDMT Oral 43 30,9 12,1 46 44,8 10,5 0,00 **
     SDMT Written 41 30,0 10,7 45 43,3 10,4 0,00 **
     Stroop 1 43 6,3 3,5 44 8,1 3,4 0,02 *
     Stroop 2 43 7,3 3,8 44 9,1 2,9 0,01 **
     Digit Span 43 8,3 2,5 45 9,7 2,8 0,01 **
Executive Function
     TMT B 42 35,3 10,5 45 49,7 9,6 0,00 **
     Stroop 3 43 6,5 4,0 44 10,0 2,9 0,00 **
     Stroop 4 42 5,9 4,2 44 9,0 3,7 0,00 **
General intellectual capasity
     Block design 42 8,2 2,3 45 11,1 3,0 0,00 **
     Similarities 43 9,2 3,6 44 9,4 3,1 0,78
* p  <.05, **p  < .01 
Note. DH: Dominant hand, NDH: Non-dominant hand, TMT: Trail Making Test, SDMT: Serial Digit Modalities Test.
Fulfilled criteria for driving
No Yes
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3.3.2 The relationship between Awareness Questionnaire/ 
BRIEF-A and outcome 
Independent samples t-tests were used to compare the results on the Awareness Questionnaire 
(AQ) and BRIEF-A between the group of patients that fulfilled the criteria for driving and the 
group of patients that did not fulfill the criteria for driving 
Table 11. Mean difference on AQ and BRIEF-A between the group of patients that fulfilled the criteria for 
driving and the group of patients that did not fulfill the criteria for driving. 
 
 
 
AQ n Mean SD n Mean SD p
Patients' scores
Total 41 45,3 5,6 46 47,2 5,7 0,12
MS 41 10,6 1,6 46 11,0 1,3 0,19
Cog 41 18,4 2,9 46 19,3 2,6 0,13
BA 41 16,2 2,3 46 16,8 2,8 0,28
Relatives' scores
Total 29 44,9 8,1 40 46,1 6,4 0,50
MS 29 10,2 1,6 40 10,7 1,7 0,24
Cog 29 18,6 4,0 40 18,9 3,1 0,70
BA 29 16,1 3,1 40 16,5 2,8 0,61
Discrepancy scores
Total 29 -0,7 8,2 40 -1,1 5,2 0,81
MS 29 -0,3 1,7 40 -0,4 1,2 0,78
Cog 29 0,0 3,9 40 -0,5 2,5 0,56
BA 29 -0,4 3,3 40 -0,2 2,7 0,79
BRIEF-A
Patients' scores
BRI 39 46,3 8,8 45 47,4 9,5 0,59
MI 39 47,1 8,5 45 47,8 9,7 0,72
GEC 39 46,5 8,5 45 47,5 9,8 0,63
Relatives' scores
BRI 28 47,1 8,0 40 48,1 9,5 0,68
MI 28 52,0 12,3 40 48,6 10,0 0,21
GEC 28 49,8 10,3 40 48,2 9,7 0,54
Discrepancy scores
BRI 28 -1,6 11,4 40 -0,6 12,1 0,72
MI 28 -7,3 19,2 40 0,7 15,5 0,06
GEC 28 -7,1 25,3 40 0,2 26,4 0,26
Note. AQ: MS: Motor/Sensory, Cog: Cognition, BA: Behavioral/Affective 
BRIEF-A: BRI: Behavior Regulation Index, MI: Metacognition Index, GEC: Global Executive Composite
Fulfilled criteria for driving
No Yes
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As apparent in Table 11, no significant differences were found between the group of patients 
that fulfilled the criteria for driving, and the group of patients that did not fulfill the criteria 
for driving in terms of how the patients reported themselves, how the relatives rated them and 
the discrepancy scores on the two questionnaires. Adjustment for age differences when 
comparing the two groups was not found necessary, as neither scores on Awareness 
Questionnaire or BRIEF-A were significantly related to the respondents’ age.  
As shown in section 3.1, the discrepancy scores contained both positive and negative 
values. Positive discrepancy scores are of less interest, as the current study concern fitness-to-
drive assessments. As including positive scores in the analysis might bias the results when 
comparing the two groups, two additional analyses were done to examine the impact of 
negative discrepancy scores on the decision to clear the patients for driving or not. 
First, all positive discrepancy scores were re-coded to the value zero, while the 
negative discrepancy scores were kept as their original scores. Both parametric (t-test for 
independent samples) and non-parametric (Mann-Whitney U-test) were applied when 
comparing the two groups. The analysis showed no significant differences between the group 
of patients that fulfilled the criteria for driving, and the group of patients that did not fulfill 
criteria for driving (see Appendix 3.1. for AQ and Appendix 3.2. for BRIEF-A).  
Second, the sample was split into two groups based on their discrepancy scores; all 
patients having the score -6 (i.e. one SD below the mean value) or less as their total AQ-
discrepancy score were categorized as a ‘high discrepancy’ group, whereas all other values 
were categorized into ‘low discrepancy’ group.  
Table 12. The relationship between AQ discrepancy groups and outcome. 
 
 
Crosstabulation
Group No Yes Total
High discrepancy n 9 9 18
% within group 50 % 50 % 100 %
Low discrepancy n 31 20 51
% within group 60,80 % 39,20 % 100 %
Total n 40 29 69
% within group 58 % 42 % 100 %
χ2 = 0.635, p = .427
Fulfilled criteria for driving
35 
 
As shown in Table 12, there were no significant differences between the two groups on the 
Awareness Questionnaire (AQ) discrepancy scores in terms of fulfilling criteria for driving or 
not. 50% of the patients in the ‘high discrepancy’ group fulfilled the criteria for driving. No 
significant differences were found between the high discrepancy group and the low 
discrepancy group in terms of demographics, medical data or results on neuropsychological 
tests.  
Equivalent grouping was carried out on BRIEF-A Global Executive Composite 
discrepancy score, where patients having the score of -28 (i.e. one SD below the mean value) 
or less on the BRIEF-A were categorized as ‘high discrepancy’ group, whereas all other 
values were categorized as ‘low discrepancy’ group.  
 
Table 13. The relationship between BRIEF-A discrepancy groups and outcome. 
 
 
Apparent from Table 13, there were no significant differences between the two groups on 
BRIEF-A discrepancy scores in terms of fulfilling criteria for driving. 46, 2% of the patients 
in the ‘high discrepancy’ group fulfilled the criteria for driving. No significant differences 
were found between the high discrepancy group and the low discrepancy group in terms of 
demographics, medical data or results on neuropsychological tests. 
 
 
 
Crosstabulation
Group No Yes Total
High discrepancy n 7 6 13
% within group 53.8% 46.2% 100 %
Low discrepancy n 21 34 55
% within group 38.2% 61.8% 100 %
Total n 28 40 68
% within group 41.2% 58.8% 100 %
χ2 = 1.07, p = .302
Fulfilled criteria for driving
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3.4 Localization of injury 
3.4.1 The relationship between Localization of injury and 
outcome 
 
Differences in localization of injury between the group of patients that fulfilled the criteria for 
driving and the group of patients that did not fulfill the criteria for driving were examined 
using cross-tabulation and Pearson Chi-Square. The patients with cerebellum pons injury 
were excluded of the analyses due to low sample size (N=5).  
 
Table 14. The relationship between localization of injury and outcome  
 
 
As shown in Table 14, no significant differences were found between the groups. However, 
there was a tendency for patients with right hemisphere injury to not fulfill the criteria for 
driving.   
 
 
 
Localization: No Yes Total
     Left n 12 16 28
% within group 42,9 % 57,1 % 100 %
     Right n 19 10 29
% within group 65,5 % 34,5 % 100 %
     Multifocal n 12 13 25
% within group 48,0 % 52,0 % 100 %
     Total n 43 39 82
% within group 52,4 % 47,6 % 100 %
χ2 = 3.22, p  = .20
Note. Missing data on localization of injury: 2 (2,2%)
                Fulfilled criteria for driving
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3.4.2 The relationship between Localization of injury and 
AQ/BRIEF-A 
 
One-way ANOVA was used to investigate the relationship between localization of injury and 
scores on the two questionnaires. With one exemption of both patients’ and relatives’ scores 
on the Motor/Sensory subscale on Awareness Questionnaire, no significant group differences 
in either mean scores or mean discrepancy scores were found. Post Hoc tests with Bonferroni 
correction showed that the group of patients with left hemisphere injury reported significantly 
better sensory-motor function than the other groups, as did their relatives. However, the 
difference on the relatives’ scores was non-significant when Bonferroni correction was 
applied (see Appendix 4.1.). Equivalent analyses were conducted on BRIEF-A, showing no 
significant differences in either mean scores or discrepancy scores between the groups (see 
Appendix 4.2.). 
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4 Discussion 
The purpose of the present study was to explore the additional value of measuring self-
awareness in cognitive assessments for holding a drivers’ license among TBI and stroke 
patients. To the author’s knowledge, no previous studies has included BRIEF-A as a measure 
of self-awareness of executive function in relation to fitness-to-drive assessments. A few 
studies have included the Awareness Questionnaire when investigating the relevance of self-
awareness in driving (Griffen et al., 2011; Scott, 2010). However, various requirements for 
fulfilling criteria for safe driving make comparisons difficult. 
The first objective of the study was to examine whether BRIEF-A can be used as a 
measure of self-awareness of executive function. Hypothesis 1 was confirmed, as the 
discrepancy scores on BRIEF-A showed moderate correlations with the discrepancy scores on 
the Awareness Questionnaire, indicating that BRIEF-A discrepancy scores may be a valid 
measure of self-awareness of executive function. However, while a substantial level of 
agreement was found between the patients’ self-rating and their relatives’ ratings on the 
Awareness Questionnaire, the relationship between the patients’ self-ratings and their 
relatives’ ratings were consistently weaker on BRIEF-A, indicating differences in rating on 
the two questionnaires of uncertain cause. The differences in ratings may be derived from 
scale qualities, especially as relatives’ rating of function post-injury compared to pre-injury 
on the Awareness Questionnaire probably require less comprehensive observation than 
reporting how often patients’ experience difficulties related to impairments on BRIEF-A. 
Furthermore, although the patients reported less impairment than their relatives, the mean 
discrepancy scores on both questionnaires show that on average, the relatives’ ratings did not 
differ significantly from the patients’ self-ratings. Interestingly, both patients and relatives 
reported on average low levels of difficulty on both questionnaires. Although the 
questionnaires were not included in the decisions for or against holding a drivers’ license, this 
may reflect social desirability effects as the associated context of fitness-to-drive assessments 
presumably influence both the patients’ reporting and relatives’ ratings in terms of 
underreporting. On the other hand, the results might indicate low average level of impaired 
self-awareness in the current sample. Finally, the assumption that Awareness questionnaire 
possesses high validity is questionable considering the range of methodological issues 
associated with the use of patients and relatives comparisons as method, discussed in section 
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4.1. However, the results indicate that BRIEF-A may function as a measure of self-awareness 
of executive function. As higher order cognitive abilities are critical for safe driving 
(Lundquist & Alinder, 2007), having an adequate awareness of executive limitations is 
essential for the ability to develop compensatory strategies at tactical and strategic levels of 
driving performance (Lundberg et al., 2003). In this respect, self-awareness of executive 
function is a highly relevant aspect that should be of consideration in fitness-to-drive 
assessments. However, more research is needed to validate the specificity of BRIEF-A as a 
measure of executive function (Løvstad et al., in press), in addition to investigating whether it 
can provide a valid measure of impaired awareness of executive functions.  
The second objective of the study was to investigate the potential additional value of 
the questionnaires, i.e. whether the Awareness Questionnaire and BRIEF-A measure other 
factors than the neuropsychological tests do. The relationships found between the Awareness 
Questionnaire and neuropsychological tests showed a predominance of significant 
correlations on the Motor/Sensory (MS)-subscale, indicating that this scale might be more 
closely related to performance on neuropsychological tests compared to the other subscales. 
Hypothesis 2.1 was confirmed, as the strongest correlations were found between the 
Motor/Sensory (MS) subscale and performance on a sensory-motoric coordination test. This 
indicates dissociation between different components of self-awareness, i.e. patients exhibiting 
more accurate self-awareness of sensory motor function than of higher order cognitive 
functioning in accordance with previous research (Prigatano, 1996). In terms of driving, this 
implies that safe driving performance at the operational level, which is related to motor-
sensory function, is more likely than safe driving performance at the tactical and strategic 
level after brain injury. BRIEF-A showed no significant correlations with neuropsychological 
tests with the exception of one subtest of visual attention, supporting hypothesis 2.2. and the 
general assumption that BRIEF-A might tap onto other aspects of executive function than the 
neuropsychological tests do (Anderson et al., 2002; McAuley et al., 2010; Løvstad et al., in 
press). However, as correlations have been found between BRIEF-A and SCL-90-R (Løvstad 
et al., in press), more research is needed to establish whether BRIEF-A are specific to 
executive functions, or if it, to some degree, also reflects general psychological distress which 
may cause temporary executive dysfunction.  
The third objective of the study was to investigate whether the measures of self-
awareness were related to outcome (patients fulfilling the criteria for driving or not), i.e. if the 
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measures could predict the outcome in the conclusions for or against holding a drivers’ 
license in the current sample. No significant differences were found between the patients that 
fulfilled the criteria for driving and the patients that did not fulfill the criteria for driving in 
terms of self-awareness, indicating that the questionnaires may be valuable as supplements in 
fitness-to-drive assessments. Thus, hypothesis 3, assuming that measures of self-awareness 
could not predict the outcome, was confirmed. Further analysis revealed that nine patients 
scoring more than one SD below the mean value on the Awareness Questionnaire discrepancy 
scores fulfilled the criteria for driving, and that six patients that fulfilled the criteria for 
driving showed high discrepancy scores on BRIEF-A. Considering how awareness of one’s 
cognitive function is a prerequisite for safe driving (Lundquist & Alinder, 2007; Tamietto et 
al., 2006), these patients might potentially represent a danger in traffic.   
The final objective of the study was to examine the relationship between location of 
injury (left, right or multifocal) and both outcome (fulfilling the criteria for driving or not) and 
self-awareness. Localization of injury was related to neither outcome nor self-awareness. 
Thus, hypothesis 4 was not confirmed, supporting research suggesting that damages in neural 
networks including multiple localizations in the brain rather than focal areas may be related to 
impaired self-awareness (Sherer et al., 2005). 
In summary, the results indicates that both BRIEF-A and the Awareness Questionnaire 
may serve as valuable supplements in fitness-to-drive assessments, as they seem to measure 
aspects of higher order cognitive functioning not covered by neuropsychological tests. 
Driving at the tactical and strategic level relies on both executive function and self-awareness, 
thus, methods measuring these aspects should be included in fitness-to-drive assessments. 
Furthermore, the results revealed that some patients with impaired self-awareness fulfilled the 
criteria for driving. Although the low-discrepancy group outnumbered the high-discrepancy 
group in terms of fulfilling the criteria, emphasize should be given to the patients with 
impaired self-awareness who fulfilled the criteria for driving, as the ability to adjust driving 
behavior depends on self-awareness of one’s own cognitive function (Lundquist & Alinder, 
2007). However, as the Awareness Questionnaire and BRIEF-A measure patients’ ability to 
recognize the existence of deficits, and not the ability to acknowledge difficulties due to 
cognitive impairment as they arise, nor strategic adjustment of behaviour (Fleming et al., 
1996), it is unknown whether the patients who exhibited adequate self-awareness in the 
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current sample may fail to make use of this knowledge when driving on the tactical and 
strategic level. Thus, methods measuring all aspects of self-awareness are needed. 
4.1 Limitations and methodological issues 
The patients participating in the study possessed distinct characteristics, thus, the sample is 
not representative. Consequently, the findings cannot be generalized with certainty. The small 
proportion of relatives’ ratings on the questionnaires reduces the sample size in analysis 
including relatives’ ratings and discrepancy scores. Furthermore, the sample size limits the 
statistical examination of the impact of localization due to the four small groups containing 
various numbers of subjects. The localization of brain injury were roughly categorized (right, 
left, multifocal and cerebellum pons), lacking accurate information about extent of injury, 
brain structures involved and diffuse axonal injury. Additionally, the present study does not 
take the differentiation between neurological and psychological factors involved in self-
awareness into account, which limits the knowledge about what the discrepancy scores imply, 
i.e., if the scores reflect impaired self-awareness attributable to neurologic injury, denial or a 
combination of both.     
The value of Awareness Questionnaire and BRIEF-A as measures of self-awareness 
are generally restricted, as they measure intellectual awareness only. Considering the possible 
dissociation between intellectual awareness, i.e. recognizing the level of functioning, and 
emergent- and anticipatory awareness, i.e. the use of this awareness to monitor online 
performance and make strategic decisions (Toglia & Kirk, 2000), one cannot assume that 
these questionnaires provide information about impaired self-awareness on several levels. 
Although impaired intellectual awareness is of profound importance for safe driving, the 
development of measures including emergent and anticipatory awareness is needed.  
The application of the models of self-awareness proposed by Crosson et al. (1989) and 
Toglia and Kirk (2000) can be questioned, as the models were not specifically developed in 
relation to safe driving performance, but focus on the impact of self-awareness on daily life 
functioning and rehabilitation. The uncertainty regarding the translational value applies for 
the questionnaires as well, as they do not measure self-awareness of driving performance. 
However, previous research have shown significant relationships between impaired self-
awareness measured by the Awareness Questionnaire and on-road driving performance 
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(Griffen et al., 2011) and performance in driving simulators (Scott, 2010). The patients in the 
current sample lacked knowledge of their own driving skills post-injury at the time of the 
fitness-to-drive assessments, as these decisions are required before the patients are allowed to 
resume driving. Thus, fitness-to-drive assessments including self-awareness of post-injury 
driving performance are difficult to conduct without a driving simulator.  
Although discrepancy ratings are the most commonly used measure of self-awareness, 
substantial methodological issues associated with this method are in need for consideration. In 
general, self-report questionnaires are reported as vulnerable to misreading of items and 
variable interpretations (McCrae, Stone, Fagan & Costa, 1998), which poses a threat to the 
validity of quantified scores (Fleming et al., 1996). As with self-reporting, relatives’ ratings 
are prone to biases and validity threats. The use of such ratings is based on the assumption 
that information from relatives provides an objective evaluation, or a valid “reality” of the 
patients’ actual function (Bach & David, 2006). However, the relatives’ experience of the 
patient is highly subjective, and a number of factors might influence the rating (Fleming et al, 
1996). There is some evidence that relatives adopt a less severe standard for rating 
impairment than clinicians, and some argue that clinician ratings is a more valid measure of 
impaired self-awareness (Sherer et al., 2003). However, clinicians’ ratings may be biased by 
other factors such as likeability (Malec, Machulda & Moessner, 1997), and their observation 
of the patients is limited. Furthermore, the use of the calculated discrepancy scores requires 
carefully interpretation as analyses on group level might contain scores of opposite directions 
confusing the mean values. The incidence of cases where patients report higher degree of 
impairment than their relatives do might be derived from various factors. Pre-morbid 
personality might influence patients’ self-perception and self-reporting, the relatives’ 
observation of the patient might be insufficient, or relatives’ motivation might bias the ratings.  
Importantly, the context of fitness-to-drive assessments make self-reporting and 
relatives’ ratings particularly vulnerable to social desirability effects and underreporting. 
Although the participants were explicitly told that the questionnaires were not part of the basis 
for the decisions, the completion of the questionnaires in relation to fitness-to-drive 
assessments were likely to affect the responses. Additionally, the context might affect 
relatives’ responses depending on the relationship with the patient, perceived earnest and the 
possible loss of driver benefits if they do not possess a drivers’ license themselves.  
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Furthermore, the assumed combination of respectively both psychological and 
biological factors that may underlie- and influence self-reporting of own difficulties 
(Ownsworth et al., 2002) are difficult to rule out. For example, while some patients 
intentionally report less difficulties than actually present, motivated by the desire to retain his 
or her driver's license, other patients report less difficulty unconsciously, on the basis of 
impaired self-awareness or denial.  
The lack of empirically based guidelines regarding determination of scaling severity 
and cut-off values (Clare, Wilson, Carter, Roth, & Hodges, 2004) provide problems 
considering that the discrepancy scores itself does not provide information about the various 
combinations of compared ratings resulting in similar discrepancy values. For example, 
patients characterizing themselves as “about the same” as before injury, while their relatives 
rate them as “a little worse” will obtain equal discrepancy scores as patients rating themselves 
as “a little worse” while their relatives rate them as “much worse”. I.e., patients can report 
both dysfunction and the same level of functioning as pre-injury, and be categorized with 
impaired self-awareness if their relatives reports higher level of impairment (Cosentino & 
Stern, 2005).  
 In summary, rating questionnaires completed by both patients and relatives are widely 
used as a measure of self-awareness, as this metacognitive phenomenon is not directly 
captured by neuropsychological tests. However, considering the number of methodological 
challenges associated with both self-reporting and relative ratings, it remains uncertain 
whether discrepancy scores can actually provide a valid measure of self-awareness, especially 
in the context of fitness-to-drive assessments. The use of relative ratings are, however, useful 
as they provide essential information about patients’ self-perception of impairments compared 
to their relatives’ perception, and are, as such, essential in cases of impaired self-awareness.  
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4.2 Implications of the present study 
The results of the current study showed that nine and six patients characterized with impaired 
self-awareness on Awareness Questionnaire and BRIEF-A, respectively, fulfilled the criteria 
for driving. The present paper illustrates the importance of self-awareness in safe driving 
performance, and raises an important question concerning the consequences of excluding 
measures of self-awareness in fitness-to-drive assessments: Do the patients with impaired 
self-awareness who fulfilled the criteria for driving constitute a danger in traffic?  
In relation to implications for research, the overall weak and non-significant 
correlations between the questionnaires and neuropsychological measures suggest that 
Awareness Questionnaire and BRIEF-A, respectively, taps onto other aspects related to safe 
driving performance than the neuropsychological tests included in the study do. However, the 
specific relevance of these measures of self-awareness in the current context remains 
unknown. 
4.3 Conclusions and future directions 
Considering the number of people involved in traffic and the importance of securing safe 
driving in order to reduce accidents, the decisions following fitness-to-drive assessments do 
involve public health issues (Tamietto, et al., 2006). Studies demonstrating higher risk of 
accident involvement after brain injury (Bivona et al., 2012; Formisano et al., 2005; Neyens 
& Boyle, 2012; Schanke et al., 2008) confirm the importance of precise fitness-to-drive 
assessments, and the risks involved in the conclusions. As accurate self-awareness of own 
cognitive function is essential for the ability to adjust driving behavior on the tactical and 
strategic level (Lundquist & Alinder, 2007), impaired self-awareness should be of 
considerably high importance in assessments of fitness-to-drive after acquired brain injury. 
This is supported by the guidelines stating that among other cognitive deficits, impaired self-
awareness is considered contrary to safe driving (Norsk Psykologforening, 2012). The 
patients in the current sample who were characterized with impaired self-awareness, yet 
fulfilled the criteria for driving, might represent a risk in traffic. However, methodological 
limitations related to the measurement of self-awareness in addition to the lack of data 
concerning actual traffic accidents preclude firm conclusions.  
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The impact of impaired self-awareness on driving performance should be examined in 
future research in order to increase our understanding of this phenomenon and its related 
aspects. Furthermore, improving the validity of measures of self-awareness is of profound 
importance. Finally, research examining the actual consequences of driving with impaired 
self-awareness is strongly needed, as it may clarify the following essential question: Are 
patients with impaired self-awareness, who fulfill neuropsychological criteria for driving, 
more frequently involved in traffic accidents than those with anticipated intact self-
awareness? Long-term follow-up accidents studies should be conducted with large groups of 
subjects who are assessed comprehensively in order to establish more evidence-based 
guidelines. The contribution of self-awareness as part of the prerequisites in decision-making 
for holding a drivers` license should be given attention. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. The Awareness Questionnaire, Norwegian version  
 Appendix 1.1. Awareness Questionnaire Patient form  
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Appendix 1.2. Awareness Questionnaire Relative form  
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Appendix 2. Distribution of discrepancy scores on Awareness Questionnaire and 
BRIEF-A 
Figure 2.1. Distribution of Awareness Questionnaire (AQ) discrepancy scores   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
               AQ Total                                                                       AQ Motor/Sensory (MS) 
             AQ Cognition (Cog)                                                AQ Behavioral/Affective (BA) 
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Figure 2.2. Distribution of Behavior Rating Inventory of Executive Function (BRIEF-A) discrepancy scores   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BRIEF-A Global Executive Composite (GEC) 
         BRIEF-A Behavior Regulation Index (BRI)            BRIEF-A Metacognitiv Index (MI) 
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Appendix 3. Group differences between the group of patients fulfilling criteria for 
driving and the group of patients not fulfilling criteria for driving  
Appendix 3.1. Group differences on the Awareness Questionnaire discrepancy scores. 
 
Positive discrepancy scores re-coded to the value zero, t-test for independent samples. Mann-
Whitney U-test showed equivalent results. 
 
Table 3.1. Group differences between the group of patients fulfilling criteria for driving and the group of 
patients not fulfilling criteria for driving on the Awareness Questionnaire discrepancy scores. 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 3.2. Group differences on the BRIEF-A discrepancy scores.  
Positive discrepancy scores re-coded to the value zero, t-test for independent samples. Mann-
Whitney U-test showed equivalent results. 
 
 
Table 3.2. Group differences between the group of patients fulfilling criteria for driving and the group of 
patients not fulfilling criteria for driving on the BRIEF-A discrepancy scores. 
 
 
 
 
Awaraness Questionnaire
Discrepancy scores n Mean SD n Mean SD p
     Total 29 -3,3 4,8 40 -2,4 4,0 0,41
     MS 29 -0,8 1,1 40 -0,6 1,0 0,53
     Cog 29 -1,5 2,0 40 -1,1 1,9 0,46
     BA 29 -0,4 3,3 40 -0,2 2,7 0,79
Note. MS: Motor/Sensory, Cog: Cognition, BA: Behavioral/Affective
Fulfilled criteria for driving
No                  Yes
BRIEF-A      Yes
Discrepancy scores n Mean SD n Mean SD p
     BRI 28 -4,8 8,1 40 -4,7 8,7 0,97
     MI 28 -11,2 15,1 40 -5,4 10,4 0,06
     GEC 28 -14,0 17,4 40 -10,0 17,9 0,37
Note. BRI: Behavioral Regulation Index, MI: Metacognitive Index,
GEC: Global Executive Composite
      No
Fulfilled criteria for driving
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Appendix 4. The relationship between Localization of injury and Awareness 
Questinnaire/BRIEF-A 
Appendix 4.1. The relationship between Localization of injury and Awareness 
Questionnaire 
Table 4.1. The relationship between Localization of injury and Awareness Questionnaire: One-way ANOVA 
 
 
 
AQ Localization n Mean SD p
Patients' scores
Left 28 47,3 5,0 ,282
Right 27 44,9 6,4
Multifocal 25 46,5 5,4
Total 80 46,3 5,6
Left 28 11,6 ,9 ,004 **
Right 27 10,4 1,6
Multifocal 25 10,5 1,5
Total 80 10,9 1,5
Left 28 18,9 2,5 ,646
Right 27 18,5 3,2
Multifocal 25 19,2 2,6
Total 80 18,9 2,8
Left 28 16,9 2,3 ,396
Right 27 16,0 2,9
Multifocal 25 16,7 2,5
Total 80 16,5 2,5
Relatives' scores
Left 24 46,1 4,8 ,759
Right 19 44,5 7,6
Multifocal 20 45,7 9,4
Total 63 45,5 7,3
Left 24 11,2 1,2 ,044 *
Right 19 10,1 1,8
Multifocal 20 10,2 1,8
Total 63 10,5 1,6
Left 24 18,2 2,6 ,630
Right 19 18,9 3,7
Multifocal 20 19,3 4,6
Total 63 18,7 3,6
Left 24 16,8 1,9 ,377
Right 19 15,5 2,6
Multifocal 20 16,3 4,1
Total 63 16,2 3,0
Cog
Total
MS
Total
MS
Cog
BA
BA
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Table 4.1. continued. 
 
 
 
Table 4.1.1. The relationship between Localization of injury and Awareness Qestionnaire: Post Hoc multiple 
comparisons (Bonferroni). 
 
 
 
 
Discrepancy scores
Left 24 -1,3 6,0 ,954
Right 19 -1,0 6,0
Multifocal 20 -,7 8,5
Total 63 -1,0 6,8
Left 24 -,4 1,2 ,782
Right 19 -,1 1,1
Multifocal 20 -,4 2,0
Total 63 -,3 1,4
Left 24 -,8 2,9 ,556
Right 19 -,1 3,2
Multifocal 20 ,2 3,8
Total 63 -,3 3,3
Left 24 -,1 2,8 ,701
Right 19 -,8 2,4
Multifocal 20 -,5 3,5
Total 63 -,4 2,9
* p  < 0,05, **p  < 0,01
Note. MS: Motor/Sensory, Cog: Cognition, BA: Behavioral/Affective
Cog
BA
Total
MS
Bonferroni
Dependent Variable (I) Localization (J)  Localization Mean Difference (I-J) Std. Error p
Patients' scores
Motor/Sensory Left Right 1,16 0,37 0,01 **
Multifocal 1,05 0,38 0,02 *
Right Left -1,16 0,37 0,01 **
Multifocal -0,11 0,38 1,00
Multifocal Left -1,05 0,38 0,02 *
Right 0,11 0,38 1,00
* p < 0,05, **p < 0,01
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Appendix 4.2. The relationship between Localization of injury and BRIEF-A 
 
Table 4.2. The relationship between Localization of injury and BRIEF-A: One-way ANOVA 
 
 
BRIEF Localization n Mean SD p
Patients' scores
Left 28 46,7 9,4 ,198
Right 25 49,5 8,7
Multifocal 24 44,8 9,1
Total 77 47,0 9,2
Left 28 46,8 8,1 ,595
Right 25 49,0 10,0
Multifocal 24 46,7 9,2
Total 77 47,5 9,1
Left 28 46,5 8,9 ,347
Right 25 49,2 9,4
Multifocal 24 45,5 9,2
Total 77 47,1 9,2
Relatives' scores
Left 24 45,5 8,0 ,285
Right 18 49,6 7,8
Multifocal 20 48,9 10,9
Total 62 47,8 9,0
Left 24 47,5 9,3 ,277
Right 18 52,1 11,5
Multifocal 20 52,4 13,0
Total 62 50,4 11,3
Left 24 46,5 8,4 ,248
Right 18 51,0 9,0
Multifocal 20 50,8 12,4
Total 62 49,2 10,1
Discrepancy scores
Left 24 1,0 10,0 ,396
Right 18 -0,8 12,3
Multifocal 20 -4,0 13,5
Total 62 -1,1 11,9
Left 24 0,3 13,5 ,396
Right 18 -4,9 20,2
Multifocal 20 -6,8 19,5
Total 62 -3,5 17,6
Left 24 1,2 22,2 ,469
Right 18 -5,7 30,1
Multifocal 20 -8,3 27,3
Total 62 -3,9 26,2
* p  < 0,05, **p  < 0,01
Note. BRI: Behavior/Regulation Index, MI: Metacognitive Index, GEC: Global Executive Composite
BRI
MI
GEC
BRI
MI
GEC
BRI
MI
GEC
